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Foreword
This Atlas “Rural Africa in motion” is produced in a context where the challenges associated with large 
movements of refugees and migrants risk to mask the benefits of migration and its positive aspects. It is 
important to restate that migration is part of the development process and, as such, migrants have shaped 
the world we live in. 
In 2015, the stock of people migrated across international borders reached 244 million. However, des-
pite public perception, the largest share of migrants, about 763 million according to the latest estimates, 
move within their own countries, to cities or to other rural locations. Circular and seasonal migration are 
also typical features of migration facilitated by improved communication and transportation networks. 
In 2016, the number of forcibly displaced persons reached an all-time high figure of 66 million people 
worldwide. More than 5 million refugees were hosted in sub-Saharan African countries.
Around 15 percent of all international migrants are originating from Africa. By 2015, nearly 33 million 
Africans had migrated internationally, of which half within the continent. However, most of the migration 
in sub-Saharan Africa (75%) is taking place within Africa, in neighbouring countries or within the region, 
and is likely to remain as such in the future. 
These migratory movements have been prompted by a complex and intertwined array of factors. People 
migrate to improve their livelihoods and in search of a better future. They move to escape poverty, food 
insecurity, lack of employment opportunities, as well as ethnic, gender and other forms of discrimination 
and marginalization. A growing number of forcibly displaced people leave their homes to flee conflicts, 
violence, persecution and human rights abuses. Climate change adds further complexities, as the com-
bination of climate events and socio-economic factors are causing more and more people to leave agri-
culture and rural areas. But rural people also move for other reasons related to access to better and higher 
education, as well as other services, and often due to family matters. 
Youth are particularly prone to migrate, in search of better opportunities and the fulfilment of their per-
sonal goals and aspirations. Youth in Africa are facing high under-employment and unemployment rates 
and many move away from rural areas because of the unattractiveness of low productivity agriculture. 
With around 20 million of people entering the labour market every year (of which 12 million in rural 
areas), the challenge for sub-Saharan Africa in the next decades is to generate enough employment to 
absorb its booming labour force. Therefore, any plan to tackle the challenges associated with migration 
must take into account its agricultural and rural dimensions. Agriculture and rural development must be 
an integral part of any response to large migratory movements. 
Throughout history, migrants have fuelled human progress, sparked innovation, spread ideas and shaped 
the world we live in. Migrants contribute to the economic development of their origin, transit and destina-
tion countries, through knowledge, skills and technology transfers. In 2015, the total flow of international 
remittances received by sub-Saharan Africa alone was USD 32 billion, compared with USD 50 billion 
of ODA payments. Investing a portion of these remittances in farm and non-farm activities can create a 
virtuous circle of employment creation and inclusive growth.
But nothing is automatic. The benefits of migration must be positively promoted through policies that 
jointly harness its potential and minimize its negative effects. In addition to programmes on agriculture 
and rural development, Early Warning and Early Action mechanisms, as well as social protection systems 
that are risk-informed and shock-responsive, can increase people’s resilience and reinforce efforts to end 
protracted crises and sustain peace. Achieving the 2030 Agenda for sustainable development will help 
provide people with sustainable livelihood alternatives in rural areas, facilitate safe, regular and orderly 
migratory movements, and support migrants as agents of development. 
The idea of this Atlas, resulting from the continued and fruitful collaboration between FAO and CIRAD, 
stems exactly from the need of new analytical tools that can improve our understanding of the complex 
and heterogeneous patterns and drivers of migration, helping us shape more coordinated and coherent 
actions. It aims at providing a stimulating overview on migration’s dynamics and drivers in sub-Saharan 
Africa which will feed the policy debate between local stakeholders, governments and the international 
community.
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Rural migration and the new dynamics of structural transformation 
in sub-Saharan Africa
14 nnnnn  Migration and structural transformation
UNDERSTANDING THE NATURE OF MIGRATION 
IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA 
Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) has a long history of internal and international 
migration. In 2015, UNDESA estimated that about 33 million of Africans 
were living outside their country of nationality, representing 14% of in-
ternational migrants worldwide. These numbers mask substantial diffe-
rences between migration flows originating from North Africa and SSA. 
While in the first case the great majority of migrants cross the continental 
borders to reach Europe, people in SSA tend to move mostly to neighbou-
ring countries or within the region. While African overseas migration 
makes the breaking news and generate heated discussions worldwide, 
yet a stubborn reality is that SSA migration mostly takes place within 
Africa and is likely to remain as such in the future. SSA is « in motion», 
but mainly within the limits of the continent. 
In relative terms, migration rates in Africa remained stable around 2% 
over the last 20 years. However, the demographic transition in the re-
gion has resulted in an unprecedented growth of the population, with the 
absolute numbers of intra-African migrants reaching about 16 million 
in 2015. Official estimates neither include the significant unrecorded 
migration within the continent, nor its substantial internal and mostly 
rural-urban migration flows. Indeed, despite the size and the political 
relevance of internal migratory flows, estimated globally to be six times 
greater than international migration, accurate data and statistics are still 
quite limited. Although the common wisdom considers sedentarity of ru-
ral societies as the norm, empirical evidence tends to show that mobility 
is much more widespread that it is often assumed.
MIGRATION IS PART OF THE PROCESS OF CHANGE 
Migration is deeply embedded in the permanent process of change of 
every society. In world’s history, and long before the general development 
of national states, migration between and across continents and regions 
has always been a critical component of structural transformation. The 
progressive shift of humankind from rural societies to cities has been 
fueled by a continuous process of rural-urban migration which progres-
sively accelerated over the last two centuries and has spread worldwide. 
In certain circumstances, migration is not a choice. It can result from the 
impossibility of people to sustain their livelihoods in the places where 
they live, due to poverty, food insecurity, or adverse conditions related to 
environmental issues or conflicts (or, in the African past, colonial coer-
cion). In these contexts of migration by necessity or forced migration, 
people may likely prefer to stay if they could. If not, they can decide to 
return home after some time away when this option exists.
But migration is more often a process where rural households try to 
adapt and manage risk, where they innovate, diversify their activities 
and livelihoods, and adopt new life styles. Migration can be temporary, 
permanent, or circular between different places. It can be selective and 
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only concern one household’s member when the others continue to live 
and work at home, or involve the entire household. 
Even if migration might be challenging, especially in the short run, it is 
potentially positive for migrants because it may open a space of oppor-
tunities, give access to new options, and facilitate their economic and 
social mobility. It can benefit both countries of origin and destination. 
At destination, migrants can act as agents of development and provide 
their labour force and skills. At origin, migration can reduce pressure 
over natural resources and foster more efficient allocation of rural la-
The data challenge  
Understanding the extent and nature of migration is a difficult objective because 
mobility is most often an obstacle to measurement and statistics. Information about 
migration dynamics in SSA is even more difficult due to the weaknesses of many 
national statistical systems: limited human and budget resources impact the avai-
lability and quality of data and its updating. In addition to estimated numbers of 
migrants, essential disaggregated data on migrants’ characteristics (age, gender, 
rural or urban location, occupations and skills, working conditions and wages, and 
social protection) is very fragmented and unreliable at national, regional and inter-
national levels. 
There is a major difference between data on international migration and data on do-
mestic migration. For international migration, the United Nations Population Division 
is the major source of reference; it uses data from national censuses to estimate 
international migrant stocks. However, census-based data are often uneven in terms 
of content and quality, or lack questions about migration, particularly temporary 
migration. Also based on census data completed by national population register re-
cords, the Global Bilateral Migration Database (GBMD) managed by the World Bank 
has more recently increased the potential to assess long-term migration trends. 
The database contains bilateral migration population (observed stocks) for 50 SSA 
countries for each decade from 1960 to 2000. 
Temporary and transit migration are not reported, which explains the lack of infor-
mation about migration from SSA to North Africa. These two types of migration are 
partly included in informal migration data for which IOM provides a useful approach 
and information sources. Short-term (i.e. for less than 12 months) and seasonal 
migration remains difficult to capture. Similarly, labour migration as well as reliable 
estimates of the economically active migrant population at the regional level are 
still largely lacking - despite efforts and ongoing initiative by ILO to develop labour 
migration modules in censuses and to implement labor force surveys (Zimbabwe is 
the only country in SSA). 
Internal migration has received less attention. Even if some data is also available 
through censuses, with the same limitations, most of the information relies on case 
studies. Only a limited number of countries have developed specific surveys on 
migrant households and on the measurement of remittances. Overall research on 
internal migration relies on indirect sources, notably on household surveys which 
are not specifically designed to capture migration, like the Living Standards Mea-
surement Surveys (LSMS) - implemented in 9 SSA countries for different years - or 
information from Health and Demographic Surveillance Systems (HDSS). The major 
constraint of these sources is the limited possibility for cross-country analysis due to 
non-standardized questions and methodology. 
An attempt to conduct surveys specifically focused on migration-related issues led 
to the Migration and Remittances Households Surveys (MRHS) project, coordinated 
by the World Bank and implemented in between 2009 and 2010. Although very use-
ful, this initiative involved only a limited number of sub-Saharan African countries 
(Burkina Faso, Kenya, Nigeria, Senegal, Uganda, and South Africa). Furthermore, in 
all the considered countries, MRHS have been performed only once, resulting in a 
dataset referring to a single point in time. The lack of panel data, allowing to build 
time series and study the evolution of migration dynamics and determinants over 
time, reduce the relevance of the collected information. Furthermore, the absence 
or scarcity of data on issues, such as circular migration and use of remittances 
for agricultural investments, limit the extent to which this data could be used to 
study the interrelations between migration and structural transformation in SSA. 
IPUMS-International or USAID’s Demographic and Health Survey Program are other 
initiatives that try to harmonize and provide data on population from censuses or 
specific surveys worldwide. 
A better understanding of migration flows in SSA, their patterns and characteristics, 
as well as the opportunities and challenges they represent would definitely need a 
coordinated and substantial effort of African countries and the international commu-
nity to collect and analyse data on rural migration.
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Blurred rural and urban categories  
Understanding rural migration as well as evolving population trends is complicated 
by the lack of an internationally agreed definition of rural areas. Although rural 
areas were historically the matrix of economic and social development and have 
always been at the centre of the development debate, they do not have a clear-cut 
definition: what is rural is what is not urban.
According to the UN Statistics Division, the rural population can be identified as 
a residual number after subtracting urban population from the total population. 
However, an additional difficulty is that cities do not have any standardised defi-
nition. The definition of urban areas varies broadly between countries. The main 
component is the size of population, with a threshold above which an agglomera-
tion becomes urban. Other criteria are used, such as the percentage of households 
engaged in agriculture, administrative boundaries or service provision, and a 
mixed approach is sometimes adopted. This categorization issue has resulted 
in an ongoing debate on the right definition of rural areas, to which the FAO is 
contributing.
However, beyond the difficulty to set a standard definition, the idea that there is 
a clear division between an urban and a rural area misshapes the reality of what 
rural, urban, growing peri-urban and “rurban” areas are today. Remote rural areas 
still exist, particularly in SSA, but generally the improved access to ICTs, infor-
mation, and to transportation networks, as well as better educational standards 
foster the movement of people, blurring the limits of the old rural – urban divide. 
Changing settlement, more integrated food systems, commuting and migration 
patterns and new lifestyles contribute to an interface where often population and 
activities cannot anymore be spatially categorised in a strict manner.
bour. Diaspora organizations and return migrants can help rural areas 
through investments, skills and technology transfers, know-how and 
social networks. Remittances directly contribute to the diversification of 
income sources and risk mitigation. As such, they help to escape poverty 
and food insecurity. On both sides, migration contributes to the overall 
process of economic diversification and to social change.
THE UNIQUE HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
OF SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
SSA’s population is expected to increase by 1.4 billion by 2050 which is 
an unprecedented demographic push. Despite a strong urbanization pro-
cess, SSA remains a rural continent. Its rural population keeps growing, 
resulting in a challenging densification of rural areas, with direct impacts 
on rural livelihoods. This unique population dynamic translates into a 
massive increase of the labour force. This represents both an opportu-
nity for growth but also a challenge for SSA countries which will need a 
conducive economic and institutional environment to foster economic di-
versification, boost job creation and absorb new labour market entrants 
in the next decades. 
However, a singular feature of SSA’s economic transformation is that ur-
banization developed without industrialization. Cities’ growth has been 
mostly supported by the expansion of informal activities which has re-
sulted in limited increase of average income, and sometimes persistent 
poverty levels. A weak fiscal base limits the capacity of cities and go-
vernments to provide the necessary public goods at the required scale. 
In this unique context, migration and rural migration in SSA cannot de-
velop along the same lines as the historical pattern observed in other 
regions of the world, where a definitive rural-urban migration directly 
fed the transformation process. In today’s globalized world, massive 
overseas migration will not play the same historical role than in Europe. 
Between 1850 and 1930, in a context of European political hegemony 
and through coercion, about 60 million European people emigrated to the 
“new worlds”, facilitating European transition and the decline of poverty. 
As a result, the conditions of SSA’s structural transformation are leading 
to renewed processes of change and new characteristics for migration.
SSA’S RURAL MIGRATION IS SHAPING 
NEW LIVELIHOODS AND TERRITORIAL DYNAMICS
Fueled by this growing and still dominant rural population, SSA’s rural 
migration activates different mechanisms. The adaptation of rural liveli-
hoods to a changing environment includes the diversification of activities 
and an increased mobility, and rural migration is a core component of 
new occupational and spatial dynamics. Despite regional differences, 
empirical evidence suggests that rural households are overwhelmingly 
engaged in agriculture, but most of them are also engaged in other acti-
vities, and 50 to 80% of them have at least one migrant member. 
African migration has become a more complex process, with more cate-
gories of people in motion, going to a larger number of destinations, both 
within their own country and to other African countries, or moving in 
steps – first internally and then internationally. If rural-urban migration is 
a prominent feature related to urbanization, limited formal employment 
opportunities and a broad precarious informal sector in most African ci-
ties foster propensity for mobility, not just into towns, but also out of 
them. Rural-rural migration and important seasonal and circular migra-
tion - both internal and international - also significantly contribute to the 
distribution of the population and the reshaping of livelihoods.  
In the last decades, renewed and diversified migration patterns have 
thrived between capital cities, small and regional towns, and their rural 
hinterlands, creating new functional spaces that are shaped by social 
and economic networks which can often cross national borders. These 
dynamics strengthen the territorial fabric of SSA countries and regional 
integration. They are also blurring boundaries between rural and urban 
areas. Rural–urban linkages, embedded within strong social, cultural and 
political dimensions are gaining a growing importance. The static and 
questionable “rural” and “urban” categories no longer capture the spa-
tial and occupational complexity of rural and urban livelihoods.
UNVEILING THE INTERPLAY OF COMPLEX DRIVERS 
OF MIGRATION
The decision to migrate is complex and influenced by a myriad of in-
terlinked factors. Considering the role of rural migration in SSA’s trans-
formation process, it is crucial to unravel the mechanisms at play, and 
identify their drivers and their combination within the diversity of regional 
contexts. 
Migration is often perceived as an erratic phenomenon largely driven by 
a desperate move to better-off cities in order to escape poverty, or by 
forced movement related to adverse local conditions. This perception, 
which partly reflects the traditional “push-pull” model of migration, is 
insufficient to fully capture the complexity of migration in contemporary 
Africa. It ignores the ambivalent and complex relationships between po-
verty and migration and misses the understanding of the agency of Afri-
can migrants, even when they face enormous constraints. Overall, this 
vision fails to account for “non-economic” cultural and social or political 
factors, which play a decisive role in determining not only the direction 
but also the characteristics of the migration flow (migrants’ gender, age 
education), as well as the type of movements. Many migrants are not 
only “driven” by effective labour demand, but also by perceived eco-
nomic opportunities, educational or socio-cultural motivations. Migrants 
have diverse socio economic profiles and different expectations, respon-
ding to diverse opportunities according to economic, political and cultural 
circumstances—changing over time, sometimes under the influence of 
migration itself.
This calls for a more comprehensive approach considering the different 
socioeconomic, political, demographic, cultural and environmental di-
mensions of the drivers of migration and the time, geographical, and 
social scales they operate in. This perspective on complexity also invites 
to a conception where drivers of migration do not work in isolation to 
initiate or to shape the migration process. On the contrary, drivers of 
migration generally operate in combination, in what can be called 
“drivers complexes”, which shape the specific form and structure of 
population movements.
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AN ATLAS ON PATTERNS, DYNAMICS, 
AND DRIVERS OF RURAL MIGRATION
This atlas on rural migration in sub-Saharan Africa adopts this compre-
hensive approach. Its primary focus is on intra-African migration, both 
within and between countries, and the very specific situation of internally 
displaced persons and refugees has not been specifically addressed. The 
first part of the atlas provides a global picture of migration dynamics, 
highlighting the contrasted patterns and diversity of migration in SSA 
and its different regions, as well as their potential for development, with 
a specific attention to rural-out migration. This part mostly relies on lite-
rature review and international databases completed by specific existing 
household surveys. 
Drawing from a diversity of case studies, the second part aims to provide 
a better understanding of the importance of local conditions. Migration 
drivers and motivations are place-based and the diverse and multiface-
ted factors that shape sub Saharan African migration dynamics reflect 
the diversity of the continent. In many countries and regions, rural mi-
gration is a complementary resource for households which are most of 
the time engaged in family farming. Their level of income is shaped by 
their farm assets, their productivity, their type of production and their 
connection to markets, as well as their environmental, economic and 
institutional conditions. It also depends on the diversification of their li-
velihoods linked to both their financial and social capital and the existing 
socio economic opportunities. Therefore, the case studies highlight this 
diversity reflected in migration patterns and drivers. 
In West Africa, migration dynamics are mostly concentrated in the sub- 
region. They reveal different systems which largely depend upon diaspo-
ra and forms of circulation that have directly contributed to maintaining 
the viability of local and regional economies. Parallel to strong migration 
overseas and in the region, Senegal has developed intense internal mi-
gration which provides answers to local constraints and the increasing 
difficulty of migration to Europe. In Zambia, back and forth movements of 
population between urban and rural areas have followed the dynamics 
of the mining industry over time. In South Africa, rural people migrate 
as a result of unemployment and poor social services. These migratory 
patterns are linked to a persistent rural–urban gap, rooted in the legacy 
of apartheid, which broke up local agriculture and economies. In Ma-
dagascar, rural migration is broadly oriented towards other rural areas. 
Migrants search for jobs and land, and struggle to open up new land 
frontiers.
The third part of the atlas illustrates the non-deterministic relation 
between a driver of migration and a migration pattern, highlighting the 
relevance of drivers complexes.
Migration patterns of rural families can deeply and quickly evolve over 
time as shown in the case of Mozambique. Shifting and relatively com-
plex combinations of drivers are rooted locally and in the political eco-
nomy of national and regional spaces. They are also linked to more global 
factors. Among them, climate change entertains a complex relationship 
with rural migration. Self-reinforcing, sometimes opposed, trends and 
unexpected disruptions are at play. Climatic events almost always com-
bine with other natural, social, political, economic and technological fac-
tors, affecting population already vulnerable due to the fragility of their 
livelihoods. 
What does the future hold now for rural migration in SSA? The complexity 
of the drivers of rural migration makes it impossible to predict how many 
people will migrate, why, who they will be, or where they will go. Yet, it 
is possible to explore how this complex system of interdependent forces 
could evolve, and to engage in proactive decisions and actions. Under the 
current international conditions and due to the economic, social, political 
and cultural characteristics of neighbouring Europe or Middle East, SSA 
rural migrants are unlikely to be in a favorable position to migrate out of 
Africa. The future nature of rural migration in the context of a booming 
rural population is one of the greatest challenge and uncertainty for the 
future prosperity of the continent. It calls for innovative strategies for 
agriculture and rural development, for harnessing the potential of mi-
gration for development, and for improving the skills and capacity of 
migrants in order to help them to become pro-active decision-makers.
INFORMING STRATEGIES TO HARNESS MIGRATION 
INTO A DESIRABLE PROCESS OF RURAL 
TRANSFORMATION AND REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT
Disentangling this complex relationship is necessary but not sufficient 
for the design of adapted multi-faceted strategies in order to turn African 
migration dynamics into a development process of SSA. 
The diverse migration patterns of rural individuals and families are res-
ponses to a diversity of constrains and contexts, and they are part of the 
structural transformation of SSA. They are all contributing to the resha-
ping of national and regional spaces and to the emergence of new func-
tional territories. As such, they call for a necessary territorial approach in 
development strategies, avoiding the excessive sectorial segmentation 
of public policies and taking advantage of growing rural–urban rela-
tionships shaped by migration dynamics. 
The spreads in this atlas offer elements of reflection about possible 
strategies, with the aim to inform public decision and action. They show 
that migration has been, is and will remain an evolving adaptive process 
of human agency. The complexity of rural migration calls for better policy 
coherence between migration and sectoral policies. It calls for strate-
gies for inclusive growth that create conditions to leave in peace and 
prosperity, by fostering rural-urban linkages, creating income genera-
ting opportunities and diversification to off-farm activities in rural areas, 
promoting investments in agriculture and rural development, increasing 
resilience of rural livelihoods, fostering climate change adaptation, and 
promoting territorial and integrated approaches to develop sustainable 
food systems. It also requires a political commitment to look at migration 
as an opportunity for the development of both countries of origin and 
destination and to promote a better management of migratory flows, 
through regular and safe migration channels. 
Migrants can be agents of development and policies that harness this 
potential are of utmost importance. In the past, migration has been lar-
gely shaped by contingent factors and long term trends, but its future 
can fully be built by a commitment to make it the result of a choice not 
a necessity.
 
Note: 
A selection of references is provided in annex for every spread (limited to five refe-
rences) and for the introduction.
All the sources and documentation used for the figures are also presented in annex, as 
well as technical notes when needed.
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Fig. 0.2: African States and case studies
Fig. 0.3: The multifaceted drivers of rural migration
Fig. 0.1: Frequency of criteria in the definition of «rural»
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Population in sub-Saharan Africa continues to grow at an unprecedented scale. This will translate into 
a massive expansion of the labour force, which will account for two thirds of the global increase. 
Both urban and rural areas are affected but, due to a delayed and stabilized pace of urbanization, 
population in rural areas continues to grow steadily.  This results in a challenging densification of 
rural areas, with direct impacts on rural livelihoods, increased mobility and diversification of activities. 
The utmost challenge for SSA today and in the next decades is to generate 
enough employment in order to absorb its booming labour force. To better 
understand the magnitude of this challenge, one can consider the annual 
cohort of youth entering the working age group: in 2015, the estimated 
yearly cohort was nearly 20 million; this will reach about 30 million in 
2030 and result in a total inflow of new working-age people of 378 million 
by that date – i.e. the current population of Canada and the United States, 
combined, in only 15 years. These numbers are not tentative estimates 
because these new “workers” have already been born (between 2000 
and 2015). Based on the existing distribution of population and estimated 
trends in migration to cities, nearly 60 % of these new workers (about 220 
million) are likely to be in rural areas.
A GROWING PRESSURE ON AGRARIAN SYSTEMS
These population dynamics will place a huge pressure on rural econo-
mies. Due to their limited diversification and to the recurring importance 
of agriculture in activities and incomes, the evolution of the sector will be 
decisive and the possible pathways will depend on the pressure on natural 
resources and their management, as well as on technical and organiza-
tional innovations that would be facilitated by a conducive economic and 
institutional environment. 
Growing demographic densities will be a challenge. SSA has for long been 
under-populated: the density in 1950 was 8.2 inhabitants per km2 and it 
reached 44.3 in 2015. These averages mask huge differences between 
different regions and countries. Sparsely populated areas (adverse natural 
conditions or historic under-population) coexist with dense settlements 
(e.g. the East African highlands, the Sudanian zone, and export-oriented 
agriculture areas). As a mechanical consequence of the demographic 
push, the average SSA density should reach 100 hab./km2 in 2050, with 
very critical country-specific situations (e.g. 1000 hab./km2 in Burundi, 
530 in Uganda, and 440 in Malawi). This means huge pressure on many 
local agrarian systems and raises the question of their viability. Tensions 
between uses (agriculture versus urbanisation or mining) and users of 
land and water will grow rapidly and will be sometimes exacerbated by 
the consequences of climate change. These will result in necessary new 
adaptive strategies, with more diversified livelihoods and multi-situated 
households using the opportunities of temporary and circular migration. 
However, depending on the context, when possible, many rural residents 
will also likely migrate permanently to other places. Devising adapted pu-
blic policies, taking into account these new territorial realities and their 
possible futures, will be decisive in order to manage and facilitate this 
massive process of change.
A UNIQUE POPULATION DYNAMIC 
Sub-Saharan Africa was the last region in the world to engage in its de-
mographic transition and, unlike Asia, this transition is slower than was 
expected. While in Southern Africa and some costal West African countries 
the number of children per woman has dropped to less than three, most 
of the other regions of the continent show slower and erratic declines. 
As a consequence, the United Nations’ demographic projections are 
regularly revised upwards. Between the 2010 and the 2017 editions of 
the World Population Prospects, the estimated SSA population in 2050 
was increased by 208 million people, with the region projected to reach 
2.2 billion inhabitants.
This demographic growth represents a massive, unprecedented change 
in scale. While SSA’s population increased by 645 million people between 
1975 and 2015 (a similar change to that seen in India), it is set to in-
crease by 2.2 times more (1.4 billion) over the same 40-year time period 
(between 2015 and 2055). It is a unique demographic feature in world 
history, which even China and India have never faced. In the meanwhile, 
the population of Europe and China is expected to decrease and India’s 
population should only increase by 28%.
A UNIQUE RURAL POPULATION GROWTH
SSA is also unique in the enduring importance of its rural population. While 
the world shifted to a slight majority of urban dwellers at the end of the 
2000s and is urbanizing quickly, the region remains mainly rural due to the 
relatively recent urbanization process. It should only reach the rural/urban 
tipping point in the late 2030s. In 2015, an estimated 62 % of people were 
still living in rural areas. 
Nevertheless, the urban population has increased tenfold since the 1960s 
and, as a consequence of booming megapolises, urbanization takes the 
headlines news. But, urban growth has stabilized at around 3.5–4 % 
per year today, against 5 % and more before the 1980s – a result of 
the limited structural transformation of most of the SSA economies. In 
the meanwhile, rural population has grown at a slower pace (estimated 
at 1.7 %, with some countries still at 2.5 % and more). However, due 
to the importance of the rural population (602 million in 2015), a conti-
nuous densification of the rural space is taking place, with nearly 380 
million additional rural residents being forecast by 2050. By 2050, 
the estimated SSA rural population is projected to be 980 million – a 
63 % increase – reaching one third of the world’s rural residents – and 
it will continue to grow well after the turn of the mid-century. Elsewhere, 
rural populations will keep declining, or start declining as in South Asia, 
from the 2030s.
A MASSIVE LABOUR FORCE BULGE
As a consequence of this spectacular population growth, and due to the 
evolving age structure of the population, the labour force of the region is 
expected to surge by 813 million by 2050. This bulge will represent about 
two thirds of the expansion in the global labour force, while the number of 
workers will decrease in China and Europe. Based on the estimated distri-
bution of the population between urban and rural areas, nearly 35 % of this 
bulge will be in rural areas, representing 280 million workers.
A change in the age structure, with a growing number of people appearing 
in the economically active group (aged 15 to 64 years), will progressively 
improve the ratio between working age and non-working age people. The 
region will be in a situation to reach its demographic dividend – i.e. the 
unique moment when the number of active people stands at its highest 
– which is a major advantage for growth as it reduces the weight of inac-
tive people and releases a significant room for manoeuvre for investment 
in equipment, education and health, as well as for workers’ income en-
hancement. However, a full positive structural impact of this anticipated 
improvement in the activity structure will depend on the development of 
a favourable economic and institutional environment (infrastructure, skills, 
innovation, and legal framework). If not, the demographic bonus (many 
workers) could turn into a demographic penalty (many jobless), and result 
in major social and political tensions.
Bruno Losch
a lastly booming rural population and the youth employment challenge
Rural Africa in motion  nnnnn  21
Fig. 1.1: Rural population in 2015
Fig. 1.4: Estimated demographic changes 
in selected regions and countries
Fig. 1.2: Estimated rural population in 2050  
(Representation proportional to population size)
Fig. 1.3: Annual cohorts entering 
the working age group in SSA (1950-2050)
Fig. 1.5. Evolution of rural population 
in selected regions and countries
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INTRA-AFRICAN MIGRATION PREVAILS 
In 2015, about 33 million Africans were living outside their home coun-
tries, although more than half of these international migrants moved 
within Africa. However, this figure masks sharp differences: while Nor-
th Africans migrate overseas (90%), sub-Saharan Africans move most-
ly within Africa (nearly 75%), to neighbouring countries or within their 
region. Western and Eastern Africa are the most dynamic regions in terms 
of sending and receiving countries. With about 5.7 and 3.6 million intra- 
regional migrants in 2015 – 97% and 67%, respectively – they exem-
plify SSA’s strong intra-regional dynamics, with leading hosting coun-
tries like Côte d’Ivoire, Nigeria, Kenya and Ethiopia. They also highlight 
the role of regional economic communities which adopted regulations 
facilitating the free movement of people, although the right to reside and 
work remains controlled. To a lesser extent, Western and Eastern Africa 
also send migrants to and receive migrants from other African regions.
These continental dynamics might even be stronger as international data 
neither include the significant intra-African unrecorded migration nor 
the dynamics of circular or non-residential migration between countries. 
If African migration is partly facilitated by free circulation regimes, it is 
also linked to the porous nature of borders that facilitates the movement 
of people and informal cross-border trade. Overall, the importance of 
circular migration results from the development over time of social and 
family networks supported by improved infrastructure and communication 
networks. 
Further, the evidence from a diversity of countries, though limited, sug-
gests that internal migration is very substantial and might even be the 
dominant migration pattern across SSA. It represents about 80% of mi-
gration in Nigeria and Uganda, 50% in Kenya and Senegal, and 38% in 
Burkina Faso, which has a specific historical relation with the bordering 
Côte d’Ivoire. This supports global estimates that consider the number of 
people moving internally as being six times greater than those who have 
emigrated.
DIFFERENTIATED SIZE AND PATTERNS OF RURAL 
AND URBAN MIGRATION
In line with SSA still growing and dominant rural population, in the five 
selected countries, the majority of migrants originate from rural areas, par-
ticularly in Uganda (85%) and Burkina Faso (93%). Quite urbanised Nigeria 
is an exception with 55% of migrants coming from urban areas, while 
urban-urban migration ranges from 3% to 18% in the other countries. 
Further, the rural and urban migration patterns present quite contrasted 
features. Reflecting the urbanization process of the region, in all these 
countries but Burkina Faso (where the connection to Côte d’Ivoire prevails), 
rural migrants principally move to national cities. In Nigeria though, ru-
ral–urban internal migration is just behind dominant internal urban–urban 
flows. Regarding international migration, rural dwellers generally migrate 
to other African countries, either to rural or urban areas, as it is the case in 
Burkina Faso where rural migration is mostly directed to rural Côte d’Ivoire 
and its vibrant cocoa sector. By contrast, urban migrants move, overall, 
to other continents and urban areas. 
Nevertheless, the scale of migration flows between rural and urban areas, 
as well as the widespread rapid urbanization across the region can be 
questioned. Census data based analyses show that, although some coun-
tries continue to urbanize very rapidly, urbanization pace has reduced. 
The explanation lies in the post-1980 structural adjustment programs that 
lessened the income gap between rural and urban areas that had been 
driving net rural–urban migration. Today, in the context of limited formal 
employment, broad precarious informal sector, and limited safety nets 
faced by most of the countries, important parts of urban livelihoods are 
also vulnerable and lack resilience. Such livelihood vulnerability has led 
to increased propensity for mobility, not just into towns, but out of them 
as well. Particularly, there are important indications of increasing circular 
migration, or reduced in-migration to cities. Livelihoods are not the only 
factor impacting circular migration. Rural–urban linkages in SSA are also 
embedded within strong social, cultural and political dimensions. Circular 
migration tends to affect the net rate of in-migration to urban areas, ex-
plaining why SSA’s urbanization is rising more slowly in some countries, 
with most of the growth coming from urban natural increase. 
Rural–rural migration also contributes to population redistribution in many 
countries. In 2010, this flow constituted about 1/3 of the internal move-
ments of people in Burkina Faso and Uganda. Rural–rural migration can 
arise when land access is possible and when new activities develop, such 
as in artisanal mining. They can reflect the extension of the agricultural 
frontier, and also be associated with crises and changes in environmen-
tal factors. However, most often, rural–rural migration results from limited 
employment opportunities in cities. Rural migration to other regions within 
the country or in neighbouring countries is often linked with the economics 
of important cash-crop production areas (e.g. cotton, groundnut, cocoa, 
coffee and also rice) that offer employment opportunities to a large num-
ber of workers.
MIGRATION IS SHAPING NEW TERRITORIAL DYNAMICS
Overall, migration in Africa has become a more complex and diverse pro-
cess. This migration creates new functional spaces that are shaped by so-
cial and economic networks. Renewed and diversified migration patterns 
have thrived over the last decades between capital cities, small and regio-
nal towns, and their rural hinterlands. These dynamics witness the blurring 
of limits between rural and urban spaces and livelihoods, and the growing 
importance of rural–urban linkages, thus portraying a new African rurality. 
The static “rural” and “urban” categories no longer capture the mixed li-
festyles and socio-economic behaviours related to the intensifying rural–
urban relations. However, public policies fail to recognize the spatial and 
occupational complexity of rural and urban livelihoods. Migration supports 
the diversification of households’ livelihoods and access to employment 
opportunities, even when temporary. It strengthens the role of small towns 
and intermediate cities, as well as local and regional dynamics. This new 
territorial reality, shaped by migration, must be a matter of concern for 
public policies, which should facilitate a better match of policy actions 
with local needs.
In sub-Saharan Africa, domestic and international migration to African countries prevails 
over overseas migration. Due to the region’s large rural population and the ongoing urbanization 
process, rural–urban migration is a prominent feature, although it actually coexists with renewed, 
diverse and contrasted other patterns, including rural–rural, urban–rural and circular migration. 
These migration dynamics reshape national and regional spaces, crafting new territorial dynamics.
prevalent, contrasted intra-african migration patterns and new territorial dynamics
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THE ELUSIVE QUEST OF SOCIOECONOMIC PROFILES 
SSA is characterized by a vast diversity of migrants’ and migrant 
households’ profiles, and drawing a standardized categorization is neither 
possible nor recommended. Developing such an approach is also compli-
cated by the limited data availability. Several reasons prevent any gene-
ralisation. Firstly, migration dynamics are context specific: migrants have 
different reasons for moving, reflecting diverse situations, opportunities 
and constraints shaped by local circumstances; and the overall country 
characteristics in terms of levels of poverty and welfare, economic di-
versification, and political and social climate count.  Secondly, compared 
with other regions of the world, socioeconomic differences are generally 
limited in rural sub-Saharan Africa: migrant and non-migrant people and 
households’ profiles are often quite similar. Their profiles are primarily 
determined by the characteristics of a region in terms of access to in-
frastructure and services, household sizes, assets, activities, and there-
fore incomes. Thirdly, rural national averages derived from the available 
household surveys tend to hide local differences and give a biased picture 
of the reality. 
While, these factors call for improved data and a more thorough unders-
tanding of the local situations, they show that rural migrants are not so 
different from their local counterparts, and that diversity also exists wit-
hin the migrant population. The major fundamental difference is simply 
that some rural dwellers decide to migrate, and others do not. The choice 
to migrate results from a combination of specific individual and family 
characteristics (networks, education, and assets), and/or is the result of 
individual preferences.
THE GREAT MAJORITY OF RURAL MIGRANTS 
ARE YOUNG PEOPLE WITH LOW EDUCATION LEVELS 
In 2015, among major areas of the world, Africa presented the highest 
proportion of young international migrants (aged 15-24) with 34 per 
cent of the total migrants. The median age of all African international 
migrants was 29. Looking more closely at a diverse group of SSA countries 
(Senegal, Burkina Faso, Nigeria, Uganda and Kenya), these trends are si-
milar for internal migration. Young people predominantly move within their 
country and form the majority of rural migrants. Overall, around 60% of 
rural migrants are between 15 and 34 years old and female migrants are 
generally younger than their male counterparts.  
The majority of migrants are males (from 60% to 80% in Eastern and 
Western Africa, respectively), which can partially be explained by specific 
social constraints affecting rural women. However, in West Africa, some 
young girls aged below 15 years migrate whereas boys rarely do, indica-
ting frequent employment as housemaids. The region is also characterised 
by larger families (with often seven or more members) which are usually 
more prone to have migrants, reflecting the difficulties of youth to access 
and inherit agricultural land, which is an incentive for migration. 
Rural people have lower school attainments than their urban counterparts, 
and rural migrants are no exception. Migrants tend, however, to spend 
more years in school than non-migrants do, as shown in Mali, Ghana, 
Ethiopia and Malawi. Differences in the education levels of between male 
and female migrants are highly irregular and dependent on the specific 
country context. It is worth stressing that the majority of rural migrants 
come from households that have better educated members. Between 60 
and 80 % of them have at least one household member that attended 
school for more than 6 years. The percentage for non-migrant households 
is generally lower by 10 to 15 %. This difference in terms of additional hu-
man capital can facilitate the first step of the migration process thanks to 
greater knowledge and social networks. When looking at the employment 
status of rural migrants at their destination, it appears that the majority of 
those with limited or no formal education end up in self-employed jobs, 
while those that have reached above the secondary education level are 
more likely to access waged employment.
MOST RURAL MIGRANTS COME FROM POOR FARM 
HOUSEHOLDS WHICH ARE SLIGHTLY BETTER OFF
Agriculture continues to be the mainstay of most rural dwellers in SSA. 
While the uptake of non-farm livelihood activities continues to surge in 
most rural areas, the majority of households still earn their living from 
farm activities. This makes agricultural income the most important source 
of revenue for the majority of households, irrespectively to their migratory 
status. Remittances in cash and kind can play a significant role in terms 
of risk management. However, remittances are rarely higher than income 
derived from the main activity, especially when people are migrating to 
neighbouring countries, which provides limited returns. In the surveyed 
countries, the majority of rural households are operating on 3 hectares of 
land or less, with Mali being an exception due to the importance of large 
family farms, including several households and extended family labour. 
On average, migrant households have slightly larger farm sizes, indicating 
greater assets to support migration. At the same time, there is little diffe-
rence between migrant and non-migrant households in terms of access to 
agricultural extension services or agricultural investments (notably irriga-
tion systems, which are very limited). 
The average daily income per person in rural areas remains very low. 
Around 60 % of household members earn less than US$1 per day, with 
the exception of Nigeria, among the surveyed countries. In this context, 
earnings of households with migrants are slightly higher, with Mali dis-
playing, on average, a quite under-differentiated situation due the limited 
amount of remittances sent from neighbouring countries (the situation is 
different in the few regions that have “specialised” in migration overseas). 
The share of migrant households earning more than US$2 per day per ca-
pita is between 20 and 30 %– about 5 to 10 percentage points more than 
the case of non-migrant households. This validates the long-held view that 
migrant households tend to be better off. The slightly greater wealth of 
households with migrants is confirmed by their better access to infrastruc-
ture and services such as safe drinking water, sanitation and electricity. 
However, the differentiation between the two groups of households in 
terms of equipment is limited (e.g. housing, radio or motorcycle).
Because of this mixed picture where migrant households do not show a 
striking difference with non-migrant ones in terms of income levels, it is 
not surprising to ascertain the search for an improved economic situation 
as being the major reason for migration (up to 80% in Senegal and Bur-
kina Faso, 50/60% in Nigeria, Uganda and Kenya). The search for better 
income generating activities is a major motivation, and migrants hope first 
to improve their living conditions and those of their families. In addition, 
family reunification and access to education are also important reasons 
for migration.
Migrants’ profiles are highly diversified and reflect the multiplicity of local conditions. Rural migrants’ 
socioeconomic characteristics are not significantly different from those of other rural dwellers. 
Rural migrants are mostly young people with limited education and employable skills, and the majority of them 
come from households relying on agriculture. Widespread rural poverty explains why migration is generally 
motivated by economic reasons, although access to education and family grouping are other important factors.
Mulugeta F. Dinbabo, Clement Mensah & Michael N. Belebema
diversity of rural migrants’ profiles
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Fig.3.2: Characteristics of international migrants per country in 2015 (stock at mid-year)
Fig.3.3: Characteristics of rural migrants and migrant households (selected countries)
Fig.3.1: Main reasons for migration (rural migrants, selected countries) 
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DIVERSE MIGRATION PATTERNS 
A key driver of domestic and international migration in Africa is the search 
for opportunities, particularly employment. Looking at very diverse coun-
tries like Nigeria, South Africa, Uganda and Burkina Faso, within Africa 
migration prevails, first domestic migration, followed by migration to other 
African countries (which is the major pattern for Burkina Faso). This is 
consistent with literature on African migration and contradicts popular 
narratives of Africa as a continent on the move to Europe. Furthermore, 
consistent with conventional knowledge, people generally migrate from 
rural to urban areas where the promise of greater economic opportunities 
exists, though many move between rural areas too. Regarding overseas 
migration, the majority of migrants from these four countries originate 
from urban areas. Rural dwellers generally migrate to other African coun-
tries. These patterns of migration have socioeconomic implications for the 
migrants’ sending countries and communities.
DIVERSE SOURCES AND DESTINATIONS 
OF REMITTANCES  
The most tangible developmental impact of migration involves the mo-
ney that migrants send back home. However, Africa only received about 
$63 billion (11%) in remittances out of about $580 billion in total glo-
bal remittances in 2015. Excluding North Africa, SSA only received about 
$32 billion (6%) of the total – a figure to be compared with about $69 
billion received by India. Within Africa, total intra-continental remittances 
in 2015 were about $11 billion, meaning that about $52 billion (83%) in 
remittances came from outside Africa. Specifically, North African countries 
– with Egypt in first place – received more than half (59%) of the total re-
mittance, followed by West Africa, where Nigeria was the major recipient. 
For intra-African remittances, most were intra-regional and West Africa 
received the highest share (79%).
In general, the value of remittances depends on the type of migration (long 
or short term) and, above all, the destination of migrants (domestic or 
international, and to high-income or middle- to low-income countries). 
The importance of intra-Africa migration partly explains the limited value 
of transfers, when compared with other regions of the world. Out of 50 
sub-Saharan Africa countries, 22 sent and 11 received more than 80% of 
remittances to and from other African countries. 
However, the real numbers of intra-African remittances may be subs-
tantially higher, because many migrants are undocumented while others 
cannot afford or gain access to official sending channels, and thus remit-
tances are often sent informally. Accordingly, in each of the four selected 
countries (and in Africa, generally) the amount of remittances did not pro-
portionally match the number of migrants to other African countries and 
to other continents, respectively. Equally, African countries remit to other 
continents, predominantly from countries in North Africa and from South 
Africa (which sent 1.2 billion in 2015). 
AFRICA REMITS ‘IN-KIND’ TOO
Many African migrants remit ‘in-kind’ too – i.e. in the form of goods, not 
cash. These remittances are most often not captured by statistics. Besides 
money, Zimbabwean migrant teachers in South Africa, for instance, send 
food, clothes, electrical items, furniture and toiletries. This positively trans-
forms the lives of families back home, alleviating poverty. In-kind remit-
tances help increase recipients’ disposable incomes and free up resources 
to pay for social services, transportation, agriculture and  entrepreneurial 
activities. 
This type of remittances is facilitated by geographical proximity and im-
proved infrastructure. It is also fostered by the high costs of remitting cash, 
which force migrants to transfer goods or to use informal channels. Africa 
has high remittance transaction costs, despite the stable and reliable flows 
from internal and external sources. At 9.8%, the cost of sending remit-
tances in Africa exceeds the global average (7.3%) and the 3% targeted in 
the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). 
In the four countries considered, although migrants in the main destination 
countries and domestic migrants both remitted in-kind, overall, between 20% 
and 35% of them were in-kind remitters at the aggregate level, with no strong 
differences between internal and international migrants. For Nigeria, though, 
56% of migrants residing in rural areas remitted in-kind in 2010.
A STRONG POTENTIAL
Nationally, remittances might be macroeconomic stabilizers and sources 
of external finance, easing balance of payments-related challenges 
by boosting forex positions. Remittance-receiving countries could thus 
access international capital markets, and pay for imports.
However, remittances are private financial transfers to migrants’ fami-
lies or communities. They potentially help reduce poverty and improve 
household consumption by diversifying incomes, thus sustaining liveliho-
ods. Recipients pay for social services (e.g. education and health). Parts 
of the remittances are sometimes invested in enterprises, construction of 
homes and agriculture – creating greater income security and opportuni-
ties for employment for households. However, remittances can generate 
problems too, depending on the specific circumstances under which such 
migration occurs, including the destination and selectivity of migration. 
They may disrupt traditional institutions and systems. They might also en-
courage dependency. Still, remittances help significantly to reduce poverty 
and improve livelihoods for many. 
The developmental impact of migration and the potential to leverage re-
mittances for development show that the African diaspora is an important 
development partner. Africa should harness migration by positively enga-
ging its diaspora and key players in the remittances space, and by carefully 
investing diaspora resources. Africa should prioritize lowering remittance 
transfer costs and promoting competition, efficiency and transparency in 
the remittance market. African states should also reform their banking 
and financial systems to ease migrants’ ability to remit through formal 
financial institutions. Indeed, remittance costs are declining, because of 
internet-based and mobile money-remitting technologies, although not 
fast enough, given the limited mobile penetration and use. Particularly, the 
development of banking facilities and services and mobile technologies 
should be extended to rural areas. This will encourage financial inclusion 
of rural poor, who account for about 60% of Africa’s population, and help 
finance rural infrastructure and social development. 
Africa is on the move, but not predominately to Europe or any other continent, as commonly thought. 
Migration patterns are diverse, both internally and internationally. 
The dynamics in these patterns symptomize the socioeconomic value of migration. 
Investing remittances and engaging the diaspora make harnessing 
migration for local and continental development an imperative.
Christopher C. Nshimbi
harnessing diverse migrant and remittance flows for development
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NEW CONSTRAINTS AND TENSIONS IN RURAL SPACES 
The population of West Africa continues to grow at a sustained pace 
(2.7%/year between 2010 and 2015). In a region that remains mainly 
rural, with a few exceptions (Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana), the impacts on rural 
spaces are direct. This is because agriculture is still prevalent while the 
natural environment is deteriorating under the impact of climate change 
and an already strong anthropogenic pressure. The areas most affected by 
the multiplication of extreme events (floods), the increase in temperatures 
or the decline and poor distribution of rainfall are the Sahelo-Sudanese 
region and coastal areas. The impacts on agriculture are amplified due 
to the weakness of infrastructure and risk management systems and the 
persistence of subsistence farming. The anticipated short- and long-term 
impacts of these changes on agriculture are all the more important as the 
most affected areas are those with high rural density. 
Tensions associated with these demographic and environmental factors 
make it difficult for young rural people to integrate. These tensions contri-
bute to the dynamics of regional migration with consequences that vary 
according to national situations. Some States have developed a dynamic 
urban economy with an agricultural model based on export crops and 
where the internal migration of rural populations is stabilised. By contrast, 
others have a less attractive urban fabric that is associated with a model 
based on family subsistence farming and a strong migratory intensity.
These tensions on resources which influence rural mobility is heighte-
ned by forms of instability and insecurity that currently affect the Sahe-
lian space in particular because of the conflict in Mali since 2012 and 
the destabilisation caused by Boko Haram around Lake Chad. Refugees 
and internally displaced persons (IDPs) are concentrated in the east 
of the Sahel/Sahara region; in 2017, Nigeria has hosted approximately 
1.9 million refugees and IDPs and Niger about 300 000. Offered sanctuary 
in camps that are often on the periphery of cities or within local commu-
nities, these refugees and IDPs contribute to destabilising the local terroirs 
in terms of access to resources (pastures, water) and the occupation of 
land (controlled access).
FOUR MAIN REGIONAL MIGRATION SYSTEMS
These constraints and tensions accumulate to increase rural mobility 
which are rooted in migration systems inherited from colonial history and 
encouraged by the new independent states. With the creation of ECOWAS 
ensuring the free movement of goods and people between the Member 
States, migration was facilitated from the middle of the 1970s, although 
the right to reside and work remains controlled.
Four main migratory systems structure the regional space and express the 
diversity of past and present rural mobility. They reflect the combinations 
of factors at work.
Concentrated in the Senegal River valley, the Senegal-Mali system is 
characterised by old rural migration. However, as early as the 1960s, this 
migration went beyond West African boundaries and changed their course 
towards Europe. Their consolidation and the investments by migrants 
were the accelerators of migration that impacted on rural villages and 
improved agricultural production systems. A diasporic system was conso-
lidated playing a crucial role into the functioning of economies based on 
family farming.
The Burkina Faso-Côte d’Ivoire system organises itself in the same way 
but focuses on rural-rural or rural-urban movements. In line with the co-
lonial policy of labour displacement in the former Upper Volta region to the 
Ivorian coffee and cocoa plantations, this system led to the establishment 
of a diaspora of small-scale farmers from Burkina Faso that was accom-
panied by circular movements of seasonal labour. The Ivorian crisis in the 
2000s led to restructuring due to thousands of Burkinabe returning to the 
urban and rural spaces of southern Burkina Faso without calling the sys-
tem into question. 
The Gulf of Guinea system structures the entire regional space through in-
ternal East-West movements and North-South movements with the other 
systems. These movements are stimulated by many urban pull factors. 
The major port cities offer rural migrants opportunities for rapid socio-eco-
nomic integration that are facilitated by the presence of a large diaspora.
Organised around the Gulf of Guinea system, the Sahelian system encom-
passes the Sahel and Sudanese area. It is characterised by the continued 
existence of a model based on seasonal circular movements organised 
around family farming that mobilises labour only during the rainy season. 
When this labour is released during the dry season, it is employed in the 
urban spaces where it has access to the indispensable income required 
to alleviate food insecurity. This fragile system presents unequal access 
to mobility according to the production systems. Households that prac-
tice subsistence farming are confined to reduced internal and often short 
distance migration because of the required farm work. Households that 
depend on more diversified and remunerative production systems may re-
lease their work force during the dry season which enables them to access 
long distance migration to the cities in the Gulf of Guinea or North or Cen-
tral Africa where they often join their diaspora members. The resources 
from migration (money or in kind transfers) increase and the departure of 
migrants reduces the pressure on local resources.
A MODEL RUNNING OUT OF STEAM?
The regional balances that were gradually built on the resources from rural 
migration and those of the local economy are under threat today and the 
entire regional migration model could run out of steam in medium term. 
Demographic and land pressure and environmental degradation are limi-
ting the access to local resources and increasing food insecurity. Conflicts 
and political instability impact on migration policies and are hindering and 
weakening the dynamics of the existing migration systems in the entire 
region.
Alternatives to migration to the cities exist but they remain marginal, much 
like artisanal mining whose rapid development attracts workers from the 
region without providing a lasting solution. Migration is taking place towar-
ds rural areas that are still sparsely populated in south-eastern Liberia or 
in eastern Guinea, for example. But they remain few as accessible land is 
rare and farming techniques are often rudimentary.
In the face of the growing demand for employment by young people in 
rural areas, pro-active and coordinated regional policies are necessary. 
They can draw on the social capital accumulated by the migration prac-
tices that have shaped the balance within the regional space; but they 
must also anticipate the current demographic readjustments as the region 
will experience a population increase of 460 million inhabitants by 2050.
In the face of population growth and the degradation of environmental conditions, 
internal and international migration is a complementary resource to family farming. 
The migration systems in West Africa are intense and rooted in time. 
Concentrated in the sub-region, they depend upon diaspora and forms of circulation that have shaped 
the migration patterns of rural people and contributed directly to maintaining the local and regional balance.
Florence Boyer
west africa: lasting and fragile complementarities between agriculture and migration
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Fig. 5.2: Inherited migration systems and rural migration dynamics
Fig. 5.1: Modelling circular migration in the Sahel: 
the case of Tahoua (Niger)
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THE LITTLE-KNOWN ASPECT OF SENEGALESE 
MIGRATION 
Senegal has a strong tradition of migration that is essentially turned 
toward the African continent and Europe (respectively 45% each). 
Migratory levels between 2008 and 2013 indicate that the main regions of 
emigration abroad are Matam, Diourbel, Thiès and Saint-Louis, where this 
type of migration is historic. Since the 2000s, the geopolitical context has 
imposed tougher conditions of travel towards Europe (more stringent entry 
in the Schengen area since the Treaty of Lisbon of 2007), while socio-eco-
nomic tensions at national level continue to heighten. 
Indeed, with 13.5 million inhabitants (last census), Senegal retains a high 
population growth rate (2.7%/year) and its population is expected to double 
by 2035. 296,000 young people arrive every year on the labour market while 
the formal offer of employment is estimated at 30,000. Urbanisation is on-
going but marked by strong polarisation and a highly unequal distribution 
of people: the Dakar region is home to nearly one quarter of Senegal’s po-
pulation on 0.3% of its national territory. Despite this, the country remains 
mostly rural (55% in 2013) and the living conditions of rural people are 
deteriorating due to land pressure, the impacts of climate change (drought) 
and low and unstable income. 
If departures abroad are widespread in the traditional regions of emigra-
tion, internal migration is playing an increasingly central role in the diver-
sification strategies of households in the face of economic and natural 
risks and the deterioration of living conditions in rural areas. Thanks to 
improved communication (transport and mobile phone), rural people are 
moving and in permanent search for real or perceived opportunities for 
better income in the most dynamic urban or agricultural areas.
YOUNG MIGRANTS IN SEARCH OF EMPLOYMENT
This mobility firstly concerns the age group of 15 to 34 years (al-
most 60% at the national level) but also young girls under 15 years of 
age who are employed as domestic workers in the city (nearly 13% 
against 4% for young boys). The integration of young people in the 
agricultural sector consistently comes up against the power relations 
and weight of the elders. According to recent surveys in the Ground-
nut Basin, the Delta and the Niayes regions, 51% of young people who 
had migrated to an urban area did not possess any resource (land 
or livestock) in the locality of origin. This situation is even more pro-
nounced for women (76%). Other investigations that also included the 
Casamance region show that migrants have generally achieved a level 
of basic education, with 40 to 60% of them having reached the secon- 
dary level. The search for work is overwhelmingly present and is the main 
motivation of migration (between 60% and 95% depending on the areas). 
However, the continuation of studies as well as apprenticeships is also a 
reason for leaving, in particular in the region of St Louis which benefits 
from wide educational offerings.
GEOGRAPHICAL REORIENTATION AND 
GROWING COMPLEXITY OF MIGRATION FLOWS
In the past, migration that was essentially from rural to urban areas but 
also towards other rural areas, came from semi-arid regions (Middle Valley 
of the Senegal River, silvo-pastoral region of Ferlo) towards Dakar or the 
Groundnut Basin (seasonal migrants known as «navetanes», i.e. those who 
come during the rainy season to provide additional support in groundnut 
cultivation). Today, if internal migration has evolved and diversified in terms 
of the profiles of migrants, destination areas, and sectors of industry, cities 
still constitute the main destination of rural people. Firstly, the Dakar region 
but more generally the urban axis Dakar - Thiès - Touba (stronghold of the 
mouride brotherhood in the Diourbel region and second largest city in the 
country) polarises 60% of migration and represents 47% of the country’s 
population (2013). The attractiveness of this megalopolis in the making 
structures the Senegalese territory. It stimulates specific activities such 
as the provision of domestic services from the region of Ziguinchor that is 
affected by isolation and security issues. It is also a learning opportunity 
for many rural youth (in particular from the Groundnut Basin) who then 
seek employment in other agricultural regions. It is especially the engine 
of many circular short to medium migration that is facilitated by the size of 
the country and its road network, and marked by city-countryside return 
trips that enable the rural youth and their families to access activities and 
additional income. 
Migratory urban-rural movements are also observed with the classic phe-
nomenon of returning migrants who invest in the agricultural sector and/
or who build in their villages of origin. However, the rural-rural type migra-
tion towards the new dynamic agricultural areas is the most remarkable. 
They illustrate the income diversification strategies of the rural youth who 
move from rain-fed production areas toward well equiped or irrigated 
areas, especially during the dry season. The two main destinations are the 
Delta region which is structured by the rice and tomato sectors, and the 
Niayes region, which represents the main horticultural production area. 
These agricultural territories show strong growth and have benefited from 
substantial public and private investments with many projects that aim 
to increase their productivity and stimulate the demand for agricultural 
workers. In addition to these two centres of attraction, migration linked to 
the system of transhumance still constitute a strategy used by the people 
of Ferlo to adapt to climatic vagaries. However, seasonal movements are 
increasingly taking place in the south-east towards eastern Senegal, in 
search for grazing areas and pastoral water points.
MIGRATION AND TERRITORIAL RESTRUCTURATION
These restructurations of the Senegalese territory linked to internal migra-
tion highlight the spatial imbalances; however, they also reveal the oppor-
tunities and the potential for a better use of local resources. To meet the 
youth employment challenge, a regional investment policy that structures 
the employment basins around investment in small towns and their agri-
cultural hinterland would contribute to easing the tensions associated with 
the hypertrophy of Dakar, the megalopolis.  The territorialisation of public 
policies, supported by Act III on decentralisation and whose operational 
phase is overdue, should contribute to find local responses to structural 
employment challenges of young people. 
Since the late 1990s, internal migration in Senegal has significantly increased. Several factors contribute 
to add complexity, such as the combined impact of population growth and underemployment, the progressive 
degradation of the natural resources, and restrictions to international movements. 
This trend of internal migration, which is the result of a broader structural crisis, 
is reshaping the national space, calling for a territorial redistribution around regional development hubs.
Cheick Oumar Ba, Jérémy Bourgoin & Djibril Diop
senegal: the fluidity of internal migration as an answer to local constraints
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Fig. 6.1: A representation of spatial dynamics
Fig. 6.3: Characteristics of migrants in surveyed regions (2012)
Fig. 6.4: Migration flows between regions
Fig. 6.2: Destination of international migrants (2013)
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URBANIZATION AND RE-RURALIZATION: THE MINING 
SECTOR DRIVER 
At the end of the 19th century, the colonists showed little interest in Nor-
thern Rhodesia, which was used mainly as a source of labour for gold 
mines in Southern Rhodesia and South Africa. It was only after the dis-
covery of Zambian copper deposits in 1928 that these international mi-
gration trends were reversed and reoriented towards internal migration. 
The activity generated by the mines led to two types of migration to the 
Copperbelt province: internal rural migration, mostly from the present Lua-
pula and Northern Provinces, and migration from neighbouring countries, 
where the first mines had already been in operation for nearly 40 years, 
with the related abundant labour force.
Until Zambia’s independence in 1964, the labour force in the mines com-
prised mostly men who would come alone to the Copperbelt from around 
the country, leaving their spouses and children behind. They would perio-
dically return to visit their families. This was mainly because there were 
movement restrictions during the colonial period to minimize staff turno-
ver. The trend toward urban settlement grew after 1964 with the end of 
restrictions on family reunification, thus contributing to the emergence of 
a category of urban workers in growing mining towns such as Ndola and 
Kitwe. Hence, fifteen years after independence, Zambia was one of the 
most urbanized countries in SSA; thus, at least 40% of Zambians were 
living in urban area, compared with the average of 22% in SSA in 1980. 
However, the links with rural villages remained, and many miners resettled 
in their villages after retirement.
The falling international copper prices from 1973 onwards marked the be-
ginning of a sharp slowdown in mining activity, which impacted on urban 
growth for thirty years. Decreasing incomes and the deterioration of public 
services related to structural adjustment policies made city life more diffi-
cult. From the 1980s to the end of the 1990s, there was  a “re-ruralization” 
due the reversed. This was despite continued migration to the capital city 
– Lusaka – especially from the Eastern, Southern and Northern Provinces. 
Between 1990 and 2000, census data show net migration rates in favour 
of rural areas (+28 per thousand in-migration for rural versus – 47 per 
thousand out-migration of urban areas). This process was supported by 
the Zambian government, which was aware of growing discontent, and 
it promoted a “back to land” movement, facilitated by the country’s large 
land availability. This quite singular re-ruralization process explains the 
high rates of rural households with urban origins in the provinces near mi-
ning areas and cities (more than 40% in the Copperbelt, Lusaka, Northern 
and North-Western Provinces).
NEW DRIVERS AND NEW PATTERNS
Despite the new mining boom of the mid-2000s, urban–to–rural migration 
has continued, supported by the strong development of the medium-scale 
farming sector. Nevertheless, the improving economic environment in 
Zambia has seen the urban–rural migration slowing down, while the rural–
to–urban flow has resumed, resulting again in urban growth. The yearly 
urban growth rate was 4.2% between 2000 and 2010, compared with 
1.5% for the period 1990–2000. During the same period, urban growth 
in the North-Western Province reached 8.3% per year, mainly due to the 
attractiveness of new mining activities in the Province.
During the same period, migration dynamics had been diversifying. The 
2010 national census highlighted a new major migration trend from urban 
to urban areas (39% of all internal lifetime migrants), especially between 
Lusaka, Central and Copperbelt Provinces. These are the most urbanized 
areas in the country and are along the main railway line. Rural–urban mi-
gration (30% of all lifetime migrants) are becoming more complex due 
to the blurring rural–urban divide resulting from better infrastructure and 
communication networks, and therefore improved mobility. Based on 
the 2010 census, most of the rural–urban flows are for non-economic 
reasons; for example joining family members, getting married, attending 
higher education, and obtaining medical care. This is certainly facilitated 
by the strong rural–urban social networks woven during the urbanization/
re-ruralization movement. Nowadays, schooling implies migration: for 
young rural dwellers, starting school at the village and continuing at boar-
ding schools in cities is a common feature when parents can afford it. It 
is possibly a first step in a migratory process, which can then be consoli-
dated by a first job in intermediate provincial towns, before a longer-term 
migration to the capital or other major cities.
In addition to the previous patterns, rural–rural migration also appeared 
in the 1990s, especially from the Western and Southern provinces to the 
Central and North-Western provinces. Successive droughts and animal di-
seases that decimated cattle were a major push factor, particularly in the 
Southern province between the late 1980s and the mid-1990s. Looking 
like providing a pioneer front dynamic, the high land availability and good 
rains in the northern regions offered a strong incentive for many families 
from the Southern Province to resettle there, while keeping strong links 
with their relatives who remained behind. Based on the 2010 census, 
rural–rural flows represented 17% of national migration.
CIRCULAR MIGRATION SUPPORTED 
BY SOCIAL NETWORKS
The higher mobility of people explains a rising renewed pattern: circular 
migration. This type of temporary migration, sometimes limited to a few 
months, is characterized by a return to the home place. It does not imply 
long distance movements as in most cases it remains intra-provincial.
This growing pattern results, on the one hand, from a somewhat lukewarm 
perception of urban opportunities and, on the other hand, from adverse 
climatic conditions and land scarcity which put pressure on agricultural 
activities and foster the search for additional incomes elsewhere.
People have become more flexible and look for quick options. This 
circular migration is facilitated by the strong urban–rural social networks 
inherited from the mining migration history and the improvement of 
infrastructure. Existing financial capital and social networks count; hence, 
the poorest rural households are likely to migrate.
The diversification of migration patterns since the 2000s has considerably 
contributed to increased population densities of some regional spaces, 
such as along the railway or the in the new mining areas. Whether de-
finitive or temporary, this strong internal migration lead to a considera-
tion of whether the territorial level is the relevant scale for designing and 
implementing public policies. Indeed, analysing local assets and specific 
constraints is a major avenue for identifying adequate development strate-
gies, taking into account the potential of these migration dynamics.
Zambia’s current population and migration patterns are shaped by past trajectories. Up until the 1980s, 
an urbanization process occurred, due to a vibrant mining industry. During the 1990s, the crash in copper prices 
and the shutting down of mines induced reverse migration flows from urban to rural areas. From the 2000s, 
the emergence of new drivers, combined with the existence of strong social networks inherited from 
the previous mining dynamics, has contributed to the diversification of Zambian migration patterns.
Pierre Girard & Antony Chapoto
zambia: internal migration at the core of territorial dynamics
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Fig. 7.2: Lifetime net migration rate per district (2010)
Fig. 7.3: Rural migrant households and reason for migration, per province (2015)
Fig. 7.1: Evolution of urban population in Zambia 
and other SSA countries (1950- 2015)
Fig. 7.4: Migration dynamics from 1930s to present
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MIGRATION DYNAMICS PRE- AND POST-1994 
Prior to 1994, migration patterns in South Africa were characterized by 
temporary labour migration, with rural men, mostly Black Africans, pro-
viding their labour to the mining industry, mainly in the Transvaal, now 
Gauteng province. They left their families at home, because of restrictions 
on movement that were imposed by apartheid laws, with dire conse-
quences on local development. With the end of restrictions of movement, 
post-apartheid South Africa has experienced a huge process of internal 
migration. Temporary migration continues and has now eased, but life-
time migration has also developed. In 2016, 9.2 million people were in-
ternal migrants (17% of total population). Only 15% of them (1.3 million) 
originated from rural areas. The interprovincial relocation of people has 
strongly reshaped South African geography, with Gauteng and the Western 
Cape provinces being the major recipients of migrants. Gauteng, the most 
populated province (around 25% of the total population) which locates the 
Johannesburg conurbation, hosts people from all over the country, while 
the Western Cape, with Cape Town, is the major destination for Eastern 
Cape migrants. The shares of residents born outside these two provinces 
are particularly high, at about 45% and 30%, respectively.
A PERSISTENT RURAL–URBAN GAP
South Africa became a predominantly urban nation in the late 1980s and 
urbanization continues at a quick pace: the rural population decreased 
from 46% in 2001 to 36% in 2016. This trend results from the amplitude 
of South African imbalances that are rooted in apartheid times, charac-
terized by huge wealth inequalities between race groups, and between 
urban and rural areas. Nearly 60% of the poor live in rural areas. This 
share remains stable and 69% of rural people are poor (2011), which is 
2.2 times the ratio of poor urban dwellers (the situation has slightly dete-
riorated, compared with 2 in 2006).
Most of the densely populated districts of the Eastern Cape, KwaZulu-Natal, 
Limpopo, Mpumalanga and the North West have high shares of rural popu-
lation. They broadly correspond with the former “Bantustans”, and this is 
where poverty is deeply anchored. Rural livelihoods still depend heavily on 
labour migration (often temporary), increasingly on social grants, and on a 
minimal and extremely low-return agriculture. This agriculture is the lega-
cy of the discriminatory colonial Land Acts which resulted in nearly 90% 
of farm land being devoted to white commercial agriculture (progressively 
shifting today to corporate farm businesses). Despite progresses made 
in terms of infrastructure and services, many rural communities remain 
underequipped (water, electricity, and good roads) and face very uneven 
access to services (health and education). Some districts still show a very 
significant level of people aged 20 and above with no schooling at all 
(12 out of the 52 districts of the country have between 15 and 25% of 
their adult population which never attended school). This adverse situa-
tion in rural areas explains a lower propensity and ability for long-term 
migration.
THE SEARCH FOR IMPROVED LIVELIHOODS
In that context, unemployment particularly hits rural areas. Job deficits re-
main as one of the biggest dilemmas of South Africa. The country faces an 
extremely high unemployment rate, which reached 27.7% in mid-2017. 
When including discouraged people who have stopped looking for work, 
the rate increases to 36.6%, and the more rural districts of the country – 
in the Eastern Cape, Limpopo and KwaZulu-Natal – experience rates well 
over 40%. 
As a consequence, looking for a job or an income-generating activity is 
a major driver of rural migration towards rural towns or cities within the 
same province or in another province. Even when migration is temporary 
and gives access to a limited work opportunity, it can be decisive and 
prevent households from becoming trapped in chronic poverty. In 2016, 
access to work opportunity was the primary motivation in KwaZulu-Natal, 
the North West and Limpopo. However, at the aggregate level, family-re-
lated reasons comprise the primary driver of migration in rural areas 
(34%). It expresses both the increasing mobility of South Africans and fa-
mily reunification, following a previous job-related migration. 
The stories of individuals and whole families moving generally convey that 
sense of hope for rural dwellers about gaining better living condition in ur-
ban areas. Access to new social housing is the third reason for migration, 
but the search for improved livelihoods, which also includes better access 
to education, is embedded within the whole process of migration.
YOUNG AND FEMALE MIGRANTS CONTRIBUTE 
TO THE NEW TERRITORIAL DYNAMICS
Some 40% of rural migrants are household heads, while 15% are spouses. 
Men constitute 52%, although the involvement of rural women is growing 
and this highlights their increasing participation in the labour market. 
However, they are more likely to migrate for temporary occupation and 
often within the same or in a nearby district (e.g. seasonal employment in 
the commercial farm sector). 
The overwhelming majority of these migrants (80%) are in the economi-
cally active group (aged 15–64) and most of them are young adults (aged 
20–29). At the national level, migrant households more often live in in-
formal dwellings (22% compared with 13% for non-migrants), which is 
a clear indicator of poor living conditions and presents a strong driver for 
change. Education is a key indicator of the employability of a migrant and 
people who are more educated are more likely to migrate. About 56% of 
migrants have completed secondary education, including Grade 12, com-
pared with 41% of non-migrants, while 8% of migrants have never at-
tended school, compared with 16% of non-migrants. Therefore, migrants 
aged 15–64 have generally a better access to employment, even if access 
is limited most of the time to the informal sector. This is the case in every 
province, with the exception of Gauteng and the Western Cape, where the 
two major economic hubs offer broader opportunities for jobs. 
In the new South Africa, migration has opened up opportunities for rural 
people who would have otherwise been permanently trapped in poverty. 
However, even when engaged in long-term migration, migrants remain 
connected to their rural settlements. They send remittances thereby 
contributing to rural livelihoods and they are part of social networks. 
These linkages facilitate the likelihood of return migration (notably with 
older migrants). Migrants increase the connection between rural and 
urban areas and between different provinces, and one of the major results 
of this growing mobility is the strengthening of spatial dynamics. Taking 
advantage of these new trends could present an opportunity for designing 
public policies that harness the potential of a more balanced territorial 
development and mitigate the growing costs of metropolization.
Post-apartheid rural migration is a response to a persistent rural–urban gap and poverty in rural areas. 
This gap is rooted in an agricultural economy that has left the overwhelming majority of the population behind. 
Unemployment and poor social services are major contributing factors of rural migration. 
A strong political will, taking advantage of growing rural–urban linkages and providing adequate public goods 
in rural areas, could support local dynamics and contribute to a more balanced territorial development.
Mulugeta F. Dinbabo, Michael N.Belebema & Clement Mensah
south africa: territorial imbalances but growing rural–urban linkages
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Fig. 8.1: An insight about South African territorial imbalances Fig. 8.2: Migration dynamics (2006-2011)
Fig. 8.3: Main reasons for migration in 2016 (rural migrants)
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THE PREVALENCE OF RURAL–RURAL MIGRATION: 
THE SEARCH FOR LAND  
In Madagascar, internal migration has been fostered since the beginning 
of the 20th century by political, religious, climatic and economic drivers. 
Whatever their forms – constrained, organized or spontaneous – they have 
contributed to the formation of national identity and human geography. 
Nowadays, and contrary to other African countries, this internal migration 
does not fuel a massive rural depopulation. Rural-to-urban migration has 
increased progressively, but internal migration remains essentially from 
rural to other rural areas. Urban growth mainly results from natural growth 
and from the administrative re-classification of municipalities from rural 
to urban. 
Despite the existing reserves of arable land across the country, the ave-
rage farm size is decreasing – a result of unbalanced population and de-
mographic growth. By extrapolating the trends observed in the last two 
agricultural censuses (1984 and 2004), the average farm size could be 
expected to halve over a 40-year period, from 1.2 ha in 1984 to 0.61 ha in 
2024. Where the population density is high (more than 100 hab/km²) and 
forests have already been cleared, land is fully occupied and subdivided 
to the extent that plots cannot be further divided for inheritances. In a 
2011 survey of 1 860 households in 4 regions, 25% of youth that were 
born and farming locally did not inherit: they had no other option than to 
buy land, knowing that good quality land is expensive (notably for rice 
production). Land markets are active but segmented and embedded in 
family and neighbour networks. In rural areas, 83% of the households live 
on less than $1.25 per day. Therefore, the only way to accumulate capital 
for investment is through seasonal or full time activities (in agriculture, 
charcoal production or mining) or/and to seek available and affordable 
land somewhere else.
MIGRATION AS A CHOICE OR A LAST RESORT? 
Willingness to migrate differs according to location. For people from the 
South, migration is part of life’s trajectories. Although a departure might 
be triggered by a harsh climate, life conditions and frequent political insta-
bility are the main drivers for migration. Youth deliberately go to the wes-
tern and northern forested areas of the country to look for for jobs, clear 
the land and produce charcoal, and then negotiate land access with local 
communities. People generally leave when population density is high and 
farm sizes are collapsing. This is the case in the highlands (central regions) 
where people consider leaving their village as the last option.
Rural areas are most often preferred to cities because they are perceived 
as offering better job opportunities (e.g. daily work in rice transplanting 
and harvesting) than urban centres where the competition is tough. Be-
cause of the limited manufacturing sector, petty jobs in the informal sector 
are the rule (handlers, street sellers) and candidates are many: about 400 
000 youth are attaining the working age every year. In that context, dyna-
mic agricultural areas retain a strong attractiveness (such as Marovoay 
and Ambatondrazaka, in the Boeny and Alaotra Mangoro regions). Howe-
ver, when they migrate, people retain control of their small agricultural 
plots (if any) in their villages of origin. These plots can be farmed by family 
members, and they remain both an alternative and a way for maintaining 
social and identity links with the land of their ancestors.
Few areas remain with agricultural land reserves and potential for hos-
ting numerous migrants. The well-known historical land frontiers (like the 
Aloatra lake basin) are now fully occupied and deforested. In these places, 
the oldest migrant families regard themselves as being natives there and 
have stopped sending the remains of their deceased back to their villages 
of origin for funerals. Land reserves which are likely to offer potential for a 
new agricultural frontier are limited (the Sofia and the Diana regions and 
areas to the east of the Amoron’i Mania or Matsiatra Ambony regions), and 
constitute probably less than 10 million hectares. These are remote areas 
with harsh and highly insecure environments (absence of public services, 
crime, and cattle theft). Few migrants desire, or are able, to settle new 
farms by their own in these large plains dedicated to extensive cattle far-
ming. It is easier and more profitable to practise slash and burn activities 
closer to existing villages and public infrastructure.
REBALANCING UNEVEN POPULATION THROUGH 
LOCAL DEVELOPMENT
The strong heterogeneity of regional demographic densities results in 
overpopulated areas with strong impacts on rural livelihoods, poverty le-
vels and natural resources, on one side, and marginalized regions with 
limited infrastructure on the other side. These different polarities are both 
drivers of, and constraints against, migration.
Since the 1970s, several development projects launched by the govern-
ment or NGOs have attempted to unlock these territorial unbalances and 
initiate organized migration. However, the focus was placed on land ac-
cess only and did not pay enough attention to the conditions necessary to 
establish a community and to develop a farm. These projects failed notably 
due to the absence of job opportunities, solidarity networks, infrastructure, 
and public services, including the rule of law providing protection against 
armed robbery. However, during the same period of time, several spon-
taneous migration dynamics were active, spreading to other regions and 
developing new agricultural plots in forested areas. 
These different past processes can inform public policies and help to 
identify ways for rebalancing territorial dynamics. The first is to supple-
ment spontaneous migration with the adequate provision of public goods 
in remote areas (infrastructure and public services). This implies: (i) the 
implementation of a land policy framework, with new tools to secure land 
access to herders, and the need to stop considering that non-cultivated 
land is not owned; (ii) a reinvestment in strategic thinking about agricultu-
ral development models and the respective roles of corporate investment 
and family farming, which offer different opportunities with different im-
pacts, notably on employment, depending on the local context; and (iii) the 
reengagement of participatory approaches, avoiding top-down practices, 
and supporting local stakeholders in the management of migration and 
agriculture development. The second way is to support rural development. 
Many young people want to stay in their own areas and they deserve 
decent living conditions. This implies secured land access, improvement 
and diversification of agricultural production systems (yields and crops), a 
diversification of rural activities (transformation of products), and ac-
cess to services through investment in small towns and regional cities. 
In Madagascar, migration is mostly rural migration to other rural areas. They are driven by growing 
difficulties related to demographic densities and high levels of poverty. Migrants search for jobs and land, and 
struggle to open up new land frontiers. For spontaneous migration to be successful, a favourable environment 
is needed. This provides a major role to play by public policies, which can support a more balanced territorial 
development through the adequate provision of public goods and the improvement of land access conditions.
Perrine Burnod, Heriniaina Rakotomalala & Jean-François Bélières
madagascar: land and jobs as main drivers of rural migration
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Fig. 9.1: Characteristics of migrant households 
in surveyed regions (2011 – 2016)
Fig. 9.2: Population density (2012) 
and importance of migration
Fig. 9.3: Rural migration dynamics related 
to labour and land access
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South Africa (and Rhodesia) that quickly shifted prior migration patterns.
First, South Africa cut labour migration enrolment to the mines: from 1975 
to 1976, the recruitment of miners in south Mozambique dropped by about 
two-thirds. Second, in the early 1980s, new economic and military actions 
contributed to undermining the socialist project that relied on state-owned 
farms producing for export and domestic food needs. Foreign-backed at-
tacks led to the destruction of main national infrastructure, as well as dis-
ruption of economic flows. Moreover, the development of the Mozambican 
National Resistance resulted in guerrilla activities that affected rural areas 
and prevented any regular agricultural production. When destabilization 
reached larger parts of the countryside from 1982, economy and agri-
cultural production collapsed and about half of the country’s population 
became dependent on external food relief. Exacerbating this situation, na-
tural hazards (1982–1985 droughts) also affected food production.
Population movements within Mozambique increased. In 1984, people 
were fleeing violence. Gradually, over 1/3 of the population was forced 
to leave their land, move to cities or military-protected rural areas, or flee 
abroad as refugees. At the end of the war in 1992, an estimated 1 mil-
lion Mozambicans had died, about 1.5 million had taken refuge abroad, 
and 4 to 5 million more had been internally displaced. These movements 
and families’ choices were also strongly determined by existing kin and 
social networks, within Mozambique or in South Africa, where many mi-
ning migrants had stayed after independence. In Leonzoane, 82% of the 
people had left, either to Massinga, Maputo or South Africa, helped by their 
networks, but leaving their land and possessions behind.
In this troubled context, new migration patterns emerged. Long term do-
mestic migration increased as a consequence of limitations of displace-
ments due to war. In Leonzoane, 70% of households just moved once 
within Mozambique or to South Africa, with rare home returns; others did 
a two-step migration, within the country and then to South Africa, with 
no return, at least until the end of the war. Local livelihoods were further 
impacted upon, with a lesser contribution of males to agriculture and a 
growing role for the informal sector.
CIRCULAR MINE MIGRATION UNDER COLONIAL RULE  
The huge labour needs of the thriving South African mining sector led 
to a specific agreement being signed in 1897 between the Portuguese 
colonial power and the Transvaal government for the provision of workers. 
The bilateral cooperation system was improved in 1928 with a convention 
ensuring the provision of Mozambican labour in exchange for taxes and 
incomes for the workers, whose return to their place of origin was en-
forced after each contract. This policy, targeting rural men, established the 
South region as a labour reserve. In the 1940–1950s, about 1/3 of active 
males in Inhambane Province were in South African mines, and to a lesser 
extent, on plantations. With wages up to 300% higher than those offered 
by Portuguese companies and planters under the existing forced labour 
system (xibalu), workers’ choice was obvious: it was a way to escape both 
xibalu and an exploitive hut tax.
Regular short-term circular migration between the main gold and coal mi-
ning areas (mostly in Transvaal state) and rural localities of south Mozam-
bique was the dominant migration pattern. In places such as Leonzoane 
(Massinga District), it concerned 65% of men. A minor pattern was the 
migration of men under the xibalu system towards Mozambican cities and 
harbours (Maputo, Beira, Chimoio) for handling and railways construction, 
or agricultural labour (cotton, sugar).
With men spending more than 50% of their working lifetime in South Afri-
ca, this migration system translated into a deep restructuring of family 
labour and farm activities. It gave rise to prevalent ‘peasant–miner’ liveli-
hoods in which men were engaged in low-wage labour, and women and 
children maintained a subsistence system at home.
LONG-TERM MIGRATION IN THE TROUBLED 
EARLY INDEPENDENCE
The independence of Mozambique in 1975 radically changed power re-
lations between the new Marxist-oriented government and the apartheid 
regime. This initiated a period of economic and military destabilization by 
DIVERSIFIED CIRCULAR MIGRATION LED 
BY LIBERALIZATION AND SOCIAL NETWORKS
With the end of warfare (1992) and apartheid (1994), new drivers reshaped 
migration.  Economic growth in democratic South Africa did not provide 
enough jobs for the black low-skilled labour force. High unemployment 
and the development of poorly paid and informal jobs directly impacted 
upon migrants from rural Mozambique, since they were likely to compete 
with unemployed local workers. Foreign miners, hit by large job losses in 
the 1990s, had no choice but to enter sub-contracting, casualization and 
undocumented labour.
In Mozambique, the government had turned to a market-oriented eco-
nomy. The new economic growth occurred with strong inequalities, rising 
rural poverty, and the broad family farming sector lacking the needed sup-
port. Migration remained an option for many, but mostly towards the South 
African informal economy. Despite South Africa’s new immigration laws 
offering migrants more rights, authorities clearly discouraged permanent 
immigration and the result was an increase of undocumented migrants. 
With peace, people were able to move again – helped by improved in-
frastructure and communication. Refugees who decided to stay in South 
Africa or in Mozambican cities have been consolidating social networks 
with their relatives in rural areas. Stronger and more complex linkages 
between places and people led to the expansion of new migration patterns 
toward a diversity of circular movements. Two-step migration patterns, 
national and then international, with home returns or short term visits, 
have developed. These profiles are the more mobile and reflect multi-sites, 
with shifting residences. The numbers of long-term national or internatio-
nal migration has also increased. This comes with new routes towards 
locations within the traditional mining areas and outside (in the Eastern 
and Western Cape and KwaZulu-Natal). 
These renewed patterns of migration are reshaping rural livelihoods as 
part of adaptation strategies to a liberalized context where informal and 
volatile labour conditions prevail. They result in increasing livelihoods’ 
differentiation in terms of income and activities, between migrants and 
non-migrant households – being the poorest – and between migrants. 
This multilevel, unsteady and complex nature of drivers of rural migration, 
as well as the development of circular migration in Southern Africa and 
their significant contribution to rural livelihoods, call for their consideration 
as a transversal issue in national development policies. It also requires 
adapted regional migration governance structures to take advantage of 
the development potential of migration for the region.
The history of migration between rural South Mozambique and South Africa, from colonial times to independence 
and post-apartheid, shows how migration patterns of rural families deeply evolve over time. Shifting and 
relatively complex combinations of drivers, rooted in the regional political economy and a range of more local 
and social factors, result in a strong and sometimes very quick adaptation capacity of rural migrants. In the last 
15 years, renewed migration drivers and patterns have resulted in a growing differentiation of rural livelihoods.
Sara Mercandalli
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Fig.10.1: Diversity of migration patterns and household livelihoods: trajectories from Massinga district (1992-2010) 
Fig.10.2: Shifting migration patterns from Inhambane province (1897-2010)
Fig.10.3: Type of support 
provided to migrants by 
kinship or 
social networks 
(Massinga district)
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CLIMATE CHANGE: A MULTI-FACETED FACTOR 
Climate change is a global phenomenon whose widespread impacts are 
becoming increasingly disruptive to human and natural systems. Clima-
tic events vary in nature, intensity and frequency. Sudden hazards, inclu-
ding floods, can cause immediate - even if often temporary - relocation 
of people moving out from devastated areas. Extreme slow onset events 
such as droughts may trigger slower but steadier forms of migration, as 
shown in the 1970s in the Sahel region. Evidence shows that communi-
ties have traditionally coped with, and adapted to, adverse environments. 
Rural populations have always displayed an extraordinary capacity of in-
novation, as illustrated by the patient shaping of many agricultural lands-
capes around the world, such as oasis agricultural systems or terrace 
cultivation. Migration has long been part of these adaptation processes 
and is a livelihoods and risk diversification strategy. Pastoralists in arid and 
semi-arid regions have developed mobility strategies to cope with climate 
variability and reduce pressure on natural resources. 
The magnitude of the effects of climate change is posing now unprece-
dented challenges and shaping migration patterns. The climate change- 
migration relationship is far from being based on linear causality. Although 
environmental changes can influence migration, the decision to migrate is 
mediated by social, economic and political structures as well as cognitive 
factors such as place attachment. The outcomes of these interactions are 
profoundly heterogeneous and can stimulate different responses, including 
immobility when climate hazards affect access to assets and resources that 
are fundamental for migration. Migration has been increasingly seen as an 
adaptive response to the impacts of climate change, operating as a buffer 
and contributing to the resilience of the communities of origin.
HITTING PARTICULARLY TROPICAL AREAS  
Tropical regions, and most notably SSA are particularly vulnerable to 
climate impacts. This vulnerability results from certain local specificities, 
such as the extensive reliance on rainfed crop production that represents 
96% of agricultural land in SSA, albeit with limited economic and institu-
tional capacity to adapt to climate change. 
Temperatures and rainfall changes can have severe impacts on livelihoods, 
shortening the time for crop maturity, increasing water stress and affecting 
flowering and seed set. Some quantitative studies indicate that tropical 
regions will experience wheat and maize crop losses as a consequence 
of even small changes in temperatures. Crop losses for major cereals are 
estimated at around 20% by 2050 if no action is taken to mitigate the 
effect of climate change. Regions that are highly sensitive to temperature 
changes such as the Sudanian region (Southern Senegal, Southern Mali 
and Burkina Faso) are expected to experience higher yield reductions than 
regions which are more sensitive to rainfall changes such as the Sahel 
(Niger, Central Mali, Northern Senegal and Burkina Faso). 
Climate change can foster food insecurity. SSA is one of the regions that 
would be the most severely hit, with scenarios projecting a 20% increase 
of malnutrition incidence in 2050. Food crises will likely result from a suc-
cession of shocks rather than isolated events and from coupling climatic 
and non-climatic factors. Forecasting rural migration patterns based on 
climate projections is indeed inaccurate and overlooks the complexity.
HITTING THE MOST VULNERABLE PEOPLE AND PLACES
The climate change-migration relationship is not only related to the expo-
sure of populations to climatic hazards and shocks but also to their sensiti-
vity and capacity to adapt to such events. Exposure to climatic hazards, de-
pendency on climate sensitive livelihood activities (i.e. rainfed agriculture) 
and low capacities and opportunities to adapt are some of the compounded 
elements that shape vulnerability, hence migration drivers and outcomes. 
In SSA, rural communities still heavily depend on climate sensitive 
livelihood activities because of the remaining importance of extractive 
activities (hunting, fishing, and gathering), and on agriculture for rural in-
comes (sales of products and self-consumption of food, water, and energy 
– wood and charcoal). The slow development of irrigation supplies, the 
low adaptive capacity of existing farming systems, and the limited insti-
tutional capacity to design and implement effective adaptation measures 
exacerbate the overreliance on natural factors. Moreover, the majority of 
rural people are poor; many are in extreme poverty, and their ability to 
cope with external shocks is limited by scarce or non-existent possibilities 
for savings. While kinship and social networks could facilitate adaptation 
strategies – including migration – other factors such as low levels of edu-
cation or limited access to assets and resources can act as barriers. Some 
regions of the continent are already facing critical environmental crises. 
These are places where land pressure is high (like the Ethiopian Highlands 
or the Great Lakes region) and where the vulnerability is also exacerbated 
by water shortages (e.g. Northern Nigeria, specific areas of Central Mali 
and Burkina Faso).
HITTING FRAGILE INSTITUTIONAL SETTINGS
Climate change affect people differently depending on their existing vulne-
rability and capacities to respond to its impacts. In countries where risk 
mitigation mechanisms are in place, people can be better equipped to 
prepare and cope with the adverse impacts of climate change. The ade-
quate provision of private insurance and public goods (civil protection) and 
the governments’ capacity to answer to basic needs in the aftermath of 
natural disasters could, for instance, allow people to reconstruct their li-
velihoods and release pressure on the need to migrate. Similarly, preven-
tive measures aiming at strengthening livelihoods resilience and reducing 
their sensitivity to climate variability could provide opportunities for people 
to thrive. Interventions to tackle the root causes of vulnerability spanning 
from building climate resilient infrastructures to boosting education and 
access to information could serve the double purpose of decreasing vulne-
rability as well as enhancing the positive impacts of migration for resilience 
building. In most SSA countries, issues such as political instability, bad 
governance, lack of capacities and limited financial resources prevent an 
effective use and implementation of similar mechanisms. Prevention and 
adaptation require development strategies based on collective choices, 
grounded in possible and desirable visions of the future and possible sce-
narios. It calls for participatory processes for adequate and efficient design 
of public policies and implementation of multi- stakeholder actions.
The link between climate change and rural migration is complex. Several entangled, 
often self-reinforcing factors are at play. The combination of climatic events and 
other natural, social, political and economic factors affect populations living in already 
vulnerable and fragile environments. Understanding how climate change interacts with 
other migration drivers requires disentangling this complexity in order to design adaptation strategies 
that address the root causes of vulnerability and tackle the challenges of climate related migration.
Robin Bourgeois, Thierry Brunelle, Bruno Losch & Giorgia Prati
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LONG-TERM, CLIMATE-RELATED MIGRATION PATTERNS 
Climatic conditions are acknowledged as constituting a major driver of 
rural outmigration from SSA, because agriculture is a very weather-sen-
sitive activity and will remain a crucial source of livelihood support and 
employment. A long-term (50 years and beyond) deleterious effect of 
climate change arises from temperature increase. Anticipated effects of 
climate change could trigger different and simultaneous patterns of mi-
gration. The first pattern is moving towards the poles. In Africa, it would 
mean more migration towards South Africa, Botswana, and Zimbabwe. 
The second pattern, moving towards the coasts, would mean migration 
towards coastal Western and Eastern Africa and the southern coast. And 
the third pattern, moving towards cooler central areas, would concern the 
plateaus and highlands of the Great Lakes region, Ethiopia and Southern 
Africa. These patterns will interact as migration towards already crowded 
coastal areas or areas affected by rising sea level could trigger a back-
flow towards central areas. These large movements of population would 
originate from rural areas where rises in temperature would adversely 
affect natural resources and the suitability of the natural environment for 
agriculture. They will be colliding also with the effect of other trends, like 
decreasing rainfall in Southern Africa. In the nearer future (10 to 20 years), 
climate variability, particularly the frequency and intensity of hazards such 
as droughts and floods, will play a more important role regarding how 
climate might affect migration.
MIGRATING WITHIN AFRICA UNDER 
DIFFERENT WORLD ORDERS  
Rural migrants have three potential destinations: rural or urban areas in 
the same or another African country, or countries overseas. From a fu-
ture-oriented perspective, the third one will be problematic as the SSA 
rural population would compete with other internationally migrating po-
pulations. Three typical world orders, commonly found in futures studies, 
can be used to describe this situation. One called “Continued growth” is 
the pursuit of current trends with economic growth being the driver of 
development and the only pathway; one called “Collapse” displays econo-
mic, environmental, resource, moral, or ideological breakdowns, leading 
to a significantly lower level of wellbeing and growing tensions; and one 
called “Discipline” refocuses the economy and society on attaining fair 
distribution of wealth and cooperation. None of these scenarios provides 
a favorable context for international migration overseas from rural SSA, 
although this does not mean that attempts to migrate from there will stop. 
The “Continued growth” scenario would favor international migration of 
highly educated and skilled migrants who are valued for their manufac-
turing and service sector skills, which are not those possessed by rural 
people. Migration policies in destination countries will also deter rural mi-
grants from SSA. In the “Collapse” scenario, the flows of migrants from 
Asia will outnumber SSA rural migrants. A “Collapse” scenario world is 
also unlikely to welcome large numbers of migrants. In the “Discipline” 
scenario, the divide between rural and urban, and developing and deve-
loped, areas is decreasing. The push-and-pull system would disappear 
and rural out-migration from SSA would be limited, based on individual 
choices and aspirations. 
The bulk of rural migration will thus take place within Africa and could 
affect existing national boundaries. Its intensity and direction will be trig-
gered, maintained and oriented by the interplay of convergent and diver-
gent economic, political, social, environmental and technological factors. 
Climate change will affect water availability, soil quality and access to 
energy. The capacity of local farming systems for coping with climatic 
hazards and for providing employment, especially to the growing num-
ber of youth entering the labour market, increasing income and improving 
the use of natural resources is crucial. Rural populations that depend on 
ecosystems under growing stress, without palliative technological pers-
pectives, will be under pressure to move out. Youth will represent the 
largest share because of their numbers, because their livelihoods need 
to be fostered – through inheritance or acquisition of production fac-
tors – and because they aspire to attain lifestyles that they cannot find 
locally. Local food insecurity, political instability, conflict and violence 
would combine with a socioeconomic environment that would encourage 
migration through rural and urban income per capita divides, failing local 
job markets for young people, or social constraints for youth and women. 
Ultimately, individual capabilities will determine who, and how many, 
among rural people will migrate. Existing intra-Africa social networks and 
diaspora, linguistic or cultural bonds will play a growing role regarding 
potential destinations for these migrants.
CHOICE OR NECESSITY? A PRO-ACTIVE APPROACH 
TO MIGRATION
A complex geography of migration in SSA is thus emerging. Crucial 
variables include the size of the rural population, the location and occur-
rence of extreme weather events (droughts and floods) and slow-onsets, 
the level of poverty and food insecurity, access to decent job opportu-
nities, the quality of governance, and the attractiveness of human habi-
tats. Rural migrants will go to African rural or urban “safe havens” that 
provide peace, stability, decent lives and livelihoods. It is impossible to 
predict where exactly these places will be found, but we can anticipate 
what could happen and act in consequence. There is a risk of a massive 
convergence of migration flows towards a limited number of “safe ha-
vens”. Once their maximum absorption capacity is exceeded, their social 
receptivity to migrants will fade, leading to conflicts that will threaten their 
existence, turning them into hostile places. More migrants would be forced 
to move and look for other options, returning to their places of origin or 
moving to less-populated areas with possibly limited opportunities and 
harsher natural conditions. 
The futures of rural migration in SSA are shaped by combined trends 
and disruptions, which can be pro-actively managed to orient the future 
shape of human settlements. Options include a concerted approach to 
intra-African migration at national and regional levels facilitating 
safe, orderly and regular migration channels, the development of 
sustainable large cities, a stronger investment in intermediary cities, and 
the development of smaller rural habitats with provision of quality ser-
vices. These options are complementary and they contribute to a more ba-
lanced approach of territorial development. The decision of a rural person 
to migrate should not be dictated by survival or search for a decent life, but 
inspired by an aspiration for new experiences. For that to happen the first 
step is a strong commitment in investing in agriculture and rural develop-
ment and to institute territorial development strategies in order to multiply 
«safe havens» that offer an attractive life. SSA rural migrants would then 
migrate by choice, and not by necessity. This future has still to be created 
through political vision and inter-African cooperation.
The complexity of the drivers of rural migration in SSA makes it impossible to predict how many people 
will migrate, why, who they will be, or where they will go. Yet, it is possible to explore how this 
complex system of interdependent forces could evolve, and to engage in proactive decisions and 
actions. SSA rural migrants are unlikely to be in a favorable position to migrate out of Africa. 
This poses a great challenge for the future prosperity of the continent: migration by necessity or by choice?
Robin Bourgeois
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Fig.12.1: Global anticipated movements of population 
due to temperature increase applied to Africa
Fig.12.2: Anticipated geography of migration drivers
Fig.12.3: Anticipated geography of migration destinations
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INTRODUCTION
Fig. 0.1
The figure provides results for 32 countries only. 16 countries out of 
32 use more than one criterion for their definition of rural areas. 
SPREAD 1 
Fig.1.2
In the anamorphic representation adopted for this figure (also na-
med cartogram), the size of countries is proportional to their rural 
population in 2050. Geographical borders are consequently modified 
in proportion to the value of the population indicator. Rural popula-
tion in 2050 is estimated by applying the share of rural population on 
total population at that date provided by the UNDESA World Urba-
nization Prospects, 2014 revision, to the estimated total population 
provided by the UNDESA World Population Prospects, 2017 revision 
(medium fertility variant). The rural population increase 2015-2050 
displayed for some countries is calculated after estimation of rural 
population in 2015 using the same method. Note that the World Ur-
banization Prospects are based on overtime estimates of the natural 
urban growth rate and the rural to urban migration rate.
Fig. 1.3
The annual cohort is calculated as one-tenth of the 15-to-24 year-old 
age group estimated in the UNDESA World Population Prospects, 
2017 revision (medium fertility variant). It is the flow entering the 
working age group (15–64). It differs from the change in the working 
age group’s size, which also takes into account people entering the 
non-working 64+ group. The absolute increase in the 15–64 group is 
less precise because in SSA-  as in other countries without a formal la-
bour market or a generalized pension system - many people continue 
to work after the age of 64. The 15-to-24 year-old age group includes 
youth attending school and students. It is assumed that they will start 
to work or look for a job or an income-generating activity between 
the ages of 15 and 24, depending on their access to the education 
system. Taking one-fifth of the 20-to-24 year-old age group instead of 
one-tenth of the 15-to-24 year-old age group would not significant-
ly change the size of the yearly cohort. Rural and urban cohorts are 
estimated by applying the shares provided by the UNDESA World 
Urbanization Prospects, 2014 revision.
Fig. 1.3
The evolution of rural population is estimated by applying the share 
of rural population on total population (1950 to 2050) provided by 
the UNDESA World Urbanization Prospects, 2014 revision, to the 
estimated total population provided by the UNDESA World Popula-
tion Prospects, 2017 revision (medium fertility variant).
SPREAD 2
Fig. 2.1
The MRHS data used in generating this figure are weighted for all 
countries but Kenya, because the vector of the sampling weight for 
this country is not included in the database.
SPREAD 3
Fig. 3.1 and 3.3
The MRHS data used in generating these figures are weighted for all 
countries but Kenya, because the vector of the sampling weight for 
this country is not included in the database. 
Fig. 3.3
The two charts presenting average results per household type were 
computed using the Living Standards Measurement Study - Inte-
grated Surveys on Agriculture (LSMS-ISA). These surveys are not 
representative at the national level. The average daily income for each 
country is standardized into US Dollar equivalents at purchasing 
power parity (PPP) to allow comparative analysis. The PPP conver-
sion factor cited from the World Development Indicators for year 
2013 was applied to income data provided in local currency units 
(LCU) in the surveys.
SPREAD 4
Fig. 4.1, 4.2 and 4.4
The estimates are based on the methodology developed by Ratha and 
Shaw (2007), “South-South Migration and Remittances”, Develop-
ment Prospects Group, World Bank. Remittance data is for 2014 and 
is disaggregated using host country and origin country incomes, and 
estimated migrant stocks from 2013. source. 
Fig 4.4 displays the share of remittances sent to Africa, calculated on 
remittances sent by country in monetary value, equal to or >$10m.
Fig. 4.3
The MRHS data used for this figure are based on weighted sample 
representative at national level except for South Africa.
SPREAD 6 
Fig. 6.4
The rural population share of the Diourbel region is estimated in 
order to take into account the importance of the agglomeration of 
Touba. The urban population of the region is estimated first by ag-
gregating the total population of Diourbel commune and Touba ag-
glomeration provided by the 2013 census. The urban population is 
then deducted from the total population to get the rural population 
and the rural share calculated. 
SPREAD 7 
Fig. 7.2 
The inter-district lifetime net migration rate (I-O/P) refers to all 
people who were enumerated in a district different from their district 
of birth. The in-born population (I) refers to persons whose place of 
residence at the time of the Census is still in the district where they 
were born. The out-migrant population (O) refers to persons whose 
place of residence at the time of the Census is not in district where 
they were born. The difference between I and O for a given district is 
divided by the population of that district (P) at the time of enumera-
tion. The limitation of this method is that certain types of migrants, 
such as temporary migrants, seasonal migrants and return migrants 
are not identifiable because they are mixed with non-migrant or mi-
grant populations. 
SPREAD 10
Illustrations and text are partly based on a 2009-2010 household 
survey implemented in Leonzoane, Massinga District, Inham-
bane Province. A stratified sample by quota, selecting households 
spanning five age groups was used to support the long term analy-
sis. Such a sample allows capturing the broad qualitative evolution 
of Leonzoane households’ migration patterns and livelihood 
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structures across time, but does not permit quantitative inference. 
The survey questionnaire adopted the principles of ‘familial, profes-
sional and migratory biography surveys’. The professional and mi-
gratory trajectories followed by households according to their age 
groups reflect the characteristics of migration and livelihoods for a 
specific period. 20-year age groups were defined in order to fit with 
the three main periods of the local history: the colonial period for the 
60+ years age group, the pre- and post-independence period for the 
41-60 years age group, and the end and post-war period for the 20–40 
years age group. For more information on the detailed methodology, 
see references: Mercandalli (2015) and (2017).
Fig. 10.1
This figure illustrates the diversity of household strategies and related 
migration trajectories. The main strategies are described in five co-
loured boxes which display the main combination of activities and 
the income group for each strategy and the share of households per 
strategy in the total sample. Only migrant household strategies are 
presented (70% of the sample). For a detailed presentation of this 
households livelihood typology see Mercandalli (2015).
The text refers to the 1928 convention. This convention established 
that “after a man had worked during 9 months - the initial contract 
period having been extended to 18 months (…) half of its incomes were 
retained and transferred to the government of Mozambique at the of-
ficial exchange rate in order to be handed to the worker by official re-
presentatives at his return” (Diario do Governo, ‘Convenção entre o 
Governo da Republica portuguesa e o Governo da União da Africa 
do Sul’, 30 November 1928.)
SPREAD 12
Fig 12.1
Adapted from the global world maps of mega-patterns driven by glo-
bal warming developed by Valsson and Ulfarsson (2012).
Fig 12.2 and 12.3
The calculation of the governance index is based on data extracted 
for SSA countries from the Ibrahim Index of African Governance 
(IIAG) database for 2015. Countries are classified in three colour 
groups according to index values as follows: Green: IIAG>60; White: 
45<IIAG<60; Red: IIAG<45. The figures only display green and red 
indexes. source
The food deficit index is based on data extracted from the FAO Food 
Security Indicators (SOFI 2015). The food deficit index is the product 
of the average value of “the prevalence of undernourishment” multi-
plied by “the depth of food deficit” over the 2002-2015 period. As per 
FA0 definitions, prevalence of undernourishment is the probability 
that a randomly selected individual from the population consumes 
an amount of calories that is insufficient to cover her/his energy re-
quirement for an active and healthy life, and depth of food deficit is 
the amount of calories that would be needed to lift the undernou-
rished from their status, everything else being constant. The food 
deficit index used in the maps displays therefore simultaneously the 
intensity and the distribution of the food deficit at country level. Only 
countries with a food deficit index below 10 (green symbol) and over 
100 (red symbol) are represented.
The data related to the projected size of the cities was acquired from 
UNDESA World Urbanization Prospects: The 2014 Revision using 
the zero-migration variant. Cities with population under 1 million 
inhabitants in 2030 are not represented.
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Sub-Saharan Africa has a long history of internal and international migratory 
movements. Migration patterns and dynamics from, to and between rural areas 
are profoundly differentiated across regions, and flows have considerably 
evolved over time. Yet, more recently, rural migration takes place in the unique 
situation of a major rural and urban demographic increase, which results in 
critical socio-economic and environmental challenges. In this context, 
intertwined migration drivers emerge and call for a better understanding of 
on-going dynamics.
This atlas offers a comprehensive analysis of the existing migration patterns as 
well as the diverse and multifaceted factors that impact on migration practices. 
It highlights the complexity of drivers at play and explains how mobility can be 
a strategic response to a rapidly changing environment. New rural livelihoods 
are contributing to intensifying rural-urban linkages and are part of the
reshaping of regional dynamics and territorial development. Supporting these 
new dynamics with adequate public policies and multi-stakeholder strategies is 
of critical importance for the future of the continent.
